注釋
關燈
小
中
大
ticobservationsverbatimfromthisexcellentwork.
22.Itisallthemoreremarkablewhen,accordingtoSchrötter,p.466，atthedeathofFrederickItherealreadyexistedalevysystemalongcontrolledlines,withexemptionofthosewithspecialpossessions,thatwasquitesimilartothesituationcreatedbythe&ldquocantonregulation.&rdquoItappearsthatthepurelyarbitraryaspectofthelevyingbytheofficerswascompletelyconsonantwiththeforcefulcharacterofFrederickWilliamI.
23.Courbière,HistoryoftheBrandenburg-PrussianMilitaryOrganization（GeschichtederBrandenburgisch-PreussischenHeeresverfassung），p.119.Whenreferenceismadeonp.120tomenof3inchesandunder3inches,thisseemstometostemfromawritingerror.Asthesmallestheight,whichwaswaivedonlyunderconditionsofacompletescarcityofmanpower,asinthelastyearoftheSevenYears'War,wecanregard5feet，5inches（1.70meters）.SeeGrünhagen,SilesiaunderFredericktheGreat（SchlesienunterFriedrichdemGrossen），1：405.Reimann,HistoryofthePrussianNation（GeschichtedespreussischenStaates），1：154，claimsthateveningarrisonregimentsmencouldnotbelessthan5feet，3inchestall.AccordingtoKoser,FriedrichderGrosse，1：538，Frederickrequiredintheolderregimentsmenof5feet，8inchesinthefrontrankand5feet，6inchesinthesecondrank.Forthenewerregiments,theserequirementswere5feet，7inchesand5feet，5inches,respectively.
24.Areportofthegovernmentoftheelectoralmarchof1811states：&ldquoInearliertimes,asfillerreplacements,onlysuchamoderatenumberofnativeswasrequiredthatonlythosesubjectswhowerecompletelydispensablewereenlisted,andthatwasdeterminedbythecivilauthorities.&rdquo
25.StudiesinBrandenburg-PrussianHistory（ForschungenzurBrandenburgisch-PreussischenGeschichte），7：308.
26.Ranke,Werke，27：230.
27.Jähns，2：914.
28.ExcerptedfromTacticalTraining（TaktischeSchulung），p.687.
29.vonOsten-Sacken,Prussia'sArmyfromItsBeginningstothePresent（PreussensHeervonseinenAnfängenbiszurGegenwart），1911，1：173.
30.Thesenumbersareestimatedfortheregimentthatwasnamed&ldquoThüna&rdquoin1784and&ldquoWinnig&rdquoin1806.Ollech，&ldquoLifeofReiher&rdquo（&ldquoLebenReihers&rdquo），Militär-Wochenblatt，1859，p.11.KunhardtvonSchmidt,Militär-Wochenblatt，1909，col.3771.Thelattercorrectlyassumesthat,inviewoftheuniformitythroughoutthearmy,theselistsgiveapicturenotonlyoftheindividualtroopunitbutoftheentireinfantryoftheperiod.Similaragerelationshipsalreadyexistedin1704.Schrötter,p.453.
31.M.Lehmann,p.278.
32.Basta（BookI,Chap.6&mdashconsequently,longbeforetheThirtyYears'War）wasalreadycomplainingaboutthestartofthepracticeoffillingthecaptains'positionsonlywitharistocrats,evenwhentheywerecompletelyinexperienced,sothatnoprivatesoldieranylongerhadthehopeofmovingup,exceptinveryexceptionalcases.AccordingtoLöwe,OrganizationofWallenstein'sArmy（OrganisationdesWallensteinschenHeeres），p.86，mostofthecolonelsandgeneralsintheThirtyYears'Warwerenobles,butamongthelowerofficerstherewerestillquiteanumberofformerprivates.G.Droysen，&ldquoContributionstotheHistoryoftheMilitarySystemDuringthePeriodoftheThirtyYears'War&rdquo（&ldquoBeiträgezurGeschichtedesMilitärwesenswährendderEpochedes30jährigenKrieges&rdquo），ZeitschriftfürKulturgeschichte,Vol.4，1875，emphasizesstrongly,inoppositiontoGansauge,thattherewasnotyetanyofficercorpsatthattime.
33.Schrötter,Brandenburgisch-PreussischeForschungen,Vol.27.
34.TreatedveryclearlybyRichardM.Meyer，&ldquoTheMilitaryTitles&rdquo（&ldquoDiemilitärischenTitel&rdquo）intheZeitschriftfürdeutscheWortforschung,Vol.12，Book3（1910），p.145.
The1726regulationofFrederickWilliamIshowsagreatsimilaritytoaSpanishregulation.Jähns，2：1577，believesthatitgoesbackdirectlytotheSpanish.Erben,intheMitteilungendeskaiserlichenundköniglichenHeeresmuseums，1（1902）：3，seemstorefutethat.Ihesitatetomakeanydefinitivejudgment.
35.SchmollerintheHistorischeZeitschrift，30：61.
36.ObservationsontheArtofWar（BetrachtungenüberdieKriegskunst），section13.
37.G.Droysen，&ldquoBeiträge，&rdquoZeitschriftfürdeutscheKulturgeschichte,newseries，4（1875）：592.
38.&ldquoReportoftheAmbassadorValoryof1748.&rdquoEd.Koser,Brandenburgisch-PreussischeForschungen，7（1894）：299.ValorystressesthemarchinginstepofthePrussianssostronglythatwemaydoubtwhethertheFrenchhadit.
39.Daniels，&ldquoFerdinandvonBraunschweig，&rdquoPreussischeJahrbücher,Vols.77，78，79，80，82.
40.AccordingtoFrederick'sso-calledMilitaryTestament,therearesupposedtohavebeen110，000nativesand80，000foreignersin1780，butthenumbersarenotentirelycertain,sincenativeswhowerenotfromtheregimentalcantonwerealsocountedasforeigners.
41.TheMilitiaGallicabyWallhausen（FrenchMilitaryServicetranslationofabookbyMontgommery），p.44，preciselystateshowbroadwasthepowerofpunishmentofeachposition.Thecolonelwasallowedtostrikeandkillwiththesword,evenofficers.Thesergeant-majorhadsimilarauthority,buthecouldalsostrikewiththestaff,thatis,withhismeasuringstick.Nobodywastofeelinsultedbythis.Thecaptainwasallowedtostrikewiththeflatofhissword.Thelieutenantsandsergeantscoulddolikewiseonthemarchorinthetrenches,butingarrisononlyagainsttheirdirectsubordinates.Theensignwasallowedtodothisonlywhensubstitutingforthelieutenantorcaptain.Thesergeant（incontradictiontotheforegoing！）couldstrikeonlyonthemarch,inbattle,onguardduty,andinthetrenches,withtheshaftofthehalberd,andnotwiththesword,ifasoldierlefthispost,butnotingarrisonorforotherreasons.
42.Daniels,PreussischeJahrbücher，82：270.
43.AccordingtotheestimatesoftheGeneralStaffWork.Thatwas,therefore,atthemomentFrederickstartedthewar.Ranke，3：148citesamemorandum,accordingtowhichFrederickWilliamI,onhisdeath,hadleftbehind83，484men,including72，000meninthefieldarmyotherstatementsshowupto89，000men.AccordingtoSchrötter,thePrussianarmyon2January1705，whenithadbeenstronglyreinforcedwiththeassistanceofthesubsidiesoftheseapowers,alreadyamountedto47，031，andwiththemilitia67，000men,thatis,almost4percentofthepopulation.
44.PreussischeJahrbücher，142：300.
4 操練與18世紀的戰術變化
1.Rüstow,GeschichtederInfanterie，2：42ff.
2.Jany,p.108.
3.Pastenacci,BattleofEnzheim（SchlachtbeiEnzheim）.
4.InthebattlesofKlissow（1702）andFraustadt（1706），theSaxoninfantrytriedunsuccessfullytoprotectitselfagainsttheSwedeswithchevaux-de-frise.
5.AccordingtoWürdinger,MilitaryHistoryofBavaria（KriegsgeschichtevonBayern），2：349，suchan&ldquoawlspear&rdquoappearsinaPassauarmoryregisterof1488.
6.AccordingtosourcescitedbyFirthinCromwell'sArmy,p.87，alightmusketwithaflintlockwasalreadyinwidespreaduseasahuntingweaponbytheGermanpeasantsatthestartoftheseventeenthcentury.In1626withthesemusketsthepeasantscompletelywipedoutimperialregimentsthatChristianofBraunschweighaddefeated.
7.AtthispointIwishtoassembleanumberofdataconcerningthetechnicalimprovementsofthefirearm,withoutclaimingaccuracyforeachindividualdate.Fromthislisting,however,wegainanoverallviewastohowgraduallysuchadevelopmentoccurs,stepbystep.
OfsignificanceinthereferencesistheworkbyThierbachintheZeitschriftfürhistorischeWaffenkunde,Vol.II，&ldquoOntheDevelopmentoftheBayonet&rdquo（&ldquoUeberdieEntwicklungdesBajonetts&rdquo）andalsoVol.III.
Secondhalfofthesixteenthcentury:papercartridgesforhorsemen.1608：loadingin95tempo.1653：papercartridgesinitiallywithouttheball.Spak,intheFestschriftfürThierbach,claimstoprovethatmusketswithoutforksweregiventotheregimentsforthefirsttimein1655.1670：introductionofcartridgesintheBrandenburginfantry.1684：flintlockmusketsintroducedinAustria.1688：thebayonetreportedlyinventedbyVauban.1690：introductionofpapercartridgesinFrance（Jähns，2：1236）.1698：LeopoldvonDessauadoptstheironramrodinhisregiment.1699：bayonetwithcross-arm.1703：finalabandonmentofthepikesbytheFrench.1708：abandonmentofthepikesbytheNetherlanders,accordingtoCoxe,LifeofMarlborough（LebenMarlboroughs），4：303.1718：theironramrodadoptedinthewholePrussianarmyfromthisyearon.1721：abandonmentofpikesbytheRussians.1733：loadingwithbayonetsfixedinPrussia（Jähns，3：2498）.1744（orpossibly1742）：theironramrodinAustria.1745：theironramrodinFrance.TheWellDrilledPrussianSoldier（DerwohlexerziertePreussischeSoldat），byJohannConradMüller，&ldquoFreeEnsignandCitizenoftheTownofSchaffhausen，&rdquo1759，statesonp.18thatshortlybeforethecurrentcampaignFrederickhadhadnewstocksplacedonallthemusketsandhadtheforemostringfortheramrodmadeinfunnelformsothattherodcouldbebroughtmoresecurelyintoplace.Theauthoralsostatesthatthegripsdescribedbyhimcouldnotbedonewiththewoodenramrod.1773:replacementoftheconicalramrodinPrussiabythecylindricalrod.
ThierbachstatesthatintestswhichNapoleonhadmadein1811，everyseventhshotwasamisfireaccordingtoSchmidt,HandFirearms（Handfeuerwaffe），p.38，ofevery100shots，20weremisfiresand10wereignitionfailures.InteststhatwereconductedbytheFrenchgovernmentin1829withthesameflintlockmusket,therewasonlyonemisfireforeveryfifteenshots.
8.Thestandardstudyisthearticle&ldquoTheTacticalTrainingofthePrussianArmybyKingFredericktheGreatduringthePeriodofPeacefrom1745to1756&rdquo（&ldquoDietaktischeSchulungderpreussischenArmeedurchKönigFriedrichdenGrossenwährendderFriedenszeit1745bis1756&rdquo）intheKriegsgeschichtlicheEinzelschriften,publishedbytheGreatGeneralStaff,Vol.28/30，1900.
9.TaktischeSchulung,p.663.
10.Jähns,p.2105.
11.Berenhorst,ObservationsontheArtofWar,ItsProgress,ItsContradictions,andItsReliability（BetrachtungenüberdieKriegskunst，überihreFortschritte,ihreWidersprücheundihreZuverlässigkeit），1797，pp.239-240.
12.TaktischeSchulung,p.665.
13.TheprinceofLignereportsthatonasingleoccasioninhismanycampaigns,intheengagementatMons（1757），heheardbayonetsstrikingagainstoneanother.Berenhorststatesthatinmilitaryhistorythereisnotasingleproperlyconfirmedexamplethattheriflesofopposingsideshadcrossedoneanotherandtherehadbeenhand-to-handfighting.EmperorWilliamIalsopaidnoattentiontotheuseofthebayonetinthetrainingofsoldiers,sincehebelievedithadnopracticalvalue.
14.Scharnhorst，3：273，statesthatmanytestshadshownthatthefiringagainstalineofcavalryresultedin403hitsof1，000shotsat100paces，149hitsat300paces,and65hitsat400paces.Inthecaseofaplatoonwelldrilledinaiming,therewereconsiderablymorehitsatthegreaterdistances,uptotwiceasmany.At400paces&ldquotheeffectwashardlytobetakenintoconsideration.&rdquoAgainstinfantry,ofcourse,theeffectwasconsiderablysmaller.Formoreonthissubject,seeTaktischeSchulung,p.431.InFirth,Cromwell'sArmy,p.89，therangeofthemusketsofthesixteenthandseventeenthcenturiesisgivenas600paces,accordingtotheevidenceofseveralconfirmingsources,anditisnotimpossiblethatthisrangewasgreaterthanthatofthemusketoftheeighteenthcentury.
15.Austria.Regulationsof1759（Regulamentvon1759）.Jähns,p.2035.
16.InagreementwithTaktischeSchulung,p.446.
17.GeneralStaff,MilitaryHistoryMonographs（KriegsgeschichtlicheEinzelschriften），27：380.
18.&ldquoDispositionsfortheBattleofZorndorf&rdquo（&ldquoDispositionfürSchlachtbeiZorndorf&rdquo），MilitärischerNachlassdesGrafenHenckel，2：79.&ldquoOnthewingthatissupposedtoattack,therewillbethreeechelons.Ifabattalioninthefirstechelonisbrokenuporrepulsed,thebattalionofthesecondechelonstandingdirectlybehinditistomoveimmediatelyintothefirstechelon,andonefromthethirdechelonmustreplaceitinthesecondechelonsothatthebattalionthatisbrokenupandrepulsedmustformagainingoodorderandadvancewiththeothers.&rdquo
19.Montecuccoli,Schriften，2：350.TheAustrianMilitaryFieldRegulationsof1759state500paces（Jähns，3：2035）.TheRegulationsfortheRoyalPrussianInfantry（ReglementvordieKöniglichePreussischeInfanterie）of1726inTitleXX,Article1，&ldquo...thatonecannotshootthatfarwithanymusketball.&rdquo
20.TheGeneralStaffWorkandthetwomonographs27and28/30addedveryvaluablenewmaterialonthissubject,butintheendtheystrayintoadescriptionoftheobliquebattleorderthatismuchtoonarrow.IthasbeenrejectedbyLieutenantColonelSchnackenburgintheJahrbücherfürArmeeundMarine,Vol.116，Book2，1900.ThebasisforthecorrectconcepthadalreadybeenfoundbyOttoHerrmannintheBrandenburg-PrussianStudies（Brandenburgisch-PreussischeForschungen），5（1892）：459，andtheentireproblemwassolvedonceandforallintheexemplarystudyofRudolfKeibel,outstandinginitssourcecritique,completeness,andreasoning,whichappearedintheBrandenburgisch-PreussischeForschungen，14（1901）：95.AfinaleffortbyJanytodefendtheconceptoftheGeneralStaffintheHohenzollern-Jahrbuch，1911，hasbeenrefutedbyO.HerrmannintheBrandenburgisch-PreussischeForschungen，27（1914）：555.
21.Montecuccoli，2：581，alsocallsNieuport,Breitenfeld,andAlterheimwingbattles.Breitenfelddidindeedbecomeawingbattle,althoughitwasnotplannedthatway.
22.Jähns，1：520，522.
23.ThedetailsaretobefoundinHerrmann,p.464.
24.Clausewitz（&ldquoSevenYears'War&rdquo），Work，10：56，writes：&ldquoAccordingtotheprejudicesandthearrangementsofthatperiod，40，000or50，000mencouldnotfightinanyotherwaythanbyforminginadvanceinacohesivebattleformation.&rdquoThereproachwhichisfeltintheword&ldquoprejudices&rdquoseemsunjustifieditwasaresultdictatedbythenatureofthings.Becausethelinesweresoextremelythin,theyhadtobeunbroken.Everyintervalwouldhaveofferedanextremelydangerouspointforapenetration.
25.AccordingtoJähns，2：1521.
26.Frederickhimself,inhisGeneral-Prinzipien（ArticleXXII,No.7），describes&ldquomyobliqueorderofbattle&rdquointhismanner：
Onerefusestheenemyonewingandreinforcestheonethatistoattackwiththelatteryoudirectallyoureffortsagainstawingoftheenemythatyoutakeintheflankanarmyof100，000men,iftakenintheflank,canbebeatenby30，000men,fortheaffairisthenquicklydecided.
27.Eventhecontinuouslineoftheinfantrywasbynomeansmaintainedrigidlybythekingrather,hefreedhimselfinkeepingwiththecircumstances.ThispointisprovenbyO.HerrmannforthebattlesofPragueandKollin,Brandenburgisch-PreussischeForschungen，26：499andnoteonp.513.
28.Itwastheirobservationandfollow-upofthisworkinallitsdetailsthatledtheGeneralStaffastrayinplacingthebeginningoftheobliquebattleformationinthisdecadeandlimitingittothecohesiveinfantryfront.ButeveninthewritingsoftheGeneralStaffitselfthislimitationisnotstrictlyadheredto,andtheworktherebybecomesinvolvedininnercontradictions,incontradictionswithKingFrederick,andincontradictionswithadocumentwrittenpersonallybythechiefoftheHistoricalSection,vonTaysen.
29.Tempelhofdescribestheapproachmarchasfollows：
Therewasnomorebeautifulsight.Theheadsofthecolumnswereconstantlyabreastofoneanotherandseparatedfromoneanotherbythedistancenecessaryforthedeploymenttheplatoonsmaintainedtheirintervalsasexactlyasiftheyweremarchinginareview.&rdquo
30.Asareasonfortheechelonedattack,hestatesthat,asaresultofthisformation,nospecialcommandwasneededfortheleftwingtomoveintothebattle.Theintervaloftheindividualbattalionsfromoneanotheramountedtofiftypaces&mdashthatis,noteven1minute'smarch.Theforwardpointoftherightwinghadadistanceof1，000pacesfromthetailoftheleftwing,ornomorethan10to15minutesofmarchingtime.
ThatitwasnottheechelonsthatbroughtvictorywasalsorecognizedbyDietrichvonBülow（Jähns，3：2139）.MajorJochim，&ldquoTheMilitaryTestamentoftheGreatKing&rdquo（&ldquoDasmilitärischeTestamentdesGrossenKönigs&rdquo），supplementtotheMilitär-Wochenblatt,Vol.7，1914，claims,contrarytotheGeneralStaffWork,p.26，thattheechelonswereformednotbybattalionsbutbybrigades（fivebattalions）.Heregardstheobliquebattleformationnotasacombatformationatall,butratherasamovementformation,andhedecisivelyrejectsthetraditionalexaggeratedestimateofitsvalue.Forhim,theobliquebattleformationwasonlyan&ldquoexpedientfortheopenplainwithnocover.&rdquoAccordingtothe&ldquoDispositionsfortheBattleofZorndorf，&rdquoasprintedintheMilitaryTestamentofCountHenckelDonnersmarck（MilitärischerNachlassdesGrafenHenckelDonnersmarck），2：78，everytwobattalionstogetherformedoneechelon.
31.Letterof8August1745.Generalstabswerk，&ldquoWarsofFredericktheGreat&rdquo（&ldquoKriegeFriedrichsdesGrossen&rdquo），1：24.
32.KurtSchmidt，&ldquoTheActivityofthePrussianFreeBattalionsintheFirstTwoCampaignsoftheSevenYears'War&rdquo（&ldquoDieTätigkeitderpreussischenFreibatailloneindenbeidenerstenFeldzügendessiebenjährigenKrieges&rdquo），Berlindissertation，1911.ErwinDette,op.cit.，p.78ff.OnHardt'ssuccessesin1759，seeGeneralstabswerk，10：124.
33.Militär-Wochenblatt，62（1895）：1602；73（1899）：1832.TheFrenchambassadorValorywroteinhisreportfor1748concerningthePrussiancavalryatthetimeofthedeathofFrederickWilliamI,Brandenburgisch-PreussischeForschungen，7：308：
Thehorsesareaccustomedtothefire,andtheriderdismountsfromhishorse,leavingthebridleonhisneck,andheplaceshimselfattheheadofthesquadroninordertofirebyrankofplatoonsandofbattalionsliketheinfantryman,andnohorsemovesfromhisplace.Ihaveseenentirehalf-squadronsdoubletheirranksfleeingfromthehorses'heels.
34.vonCanitz,InformationandObservationsontheFatesoftheMountedForces（NachrichteundBetrachtungenüberdieSchicksalederReiterei），p.7.
35.AccordingtoDesbrièreandSautai,Organisationettactiquedestroisarmes,Paris，1906.
36.Writings（Schriften），2：176.
37.KavalleristischeMonatshefte，1908，p.908，&ldquoOntheDetailsandResultsofMountedClashes&rdquo（&ldquoUeberVerlaufandErgebnisvonReiterzusammenstössen&rdquo）.
5 戰略
1.Itwillbeworththetroubletonotethat,handinhandwiththenewperiodofstrategy,therealsoappearedtheuseofanaidthatbecameincreasinglyimportantwiththepassageoftime,theuseofmaps.JoviusrelatesthatbeforethebattleofMarignanoin1515therewerelaidoutfortheSwissleadersinthecastleofMilanparchmentsheetsonwhichweredrawntheroadsandadjoiningareas."Membranaeinmediumprolatae,quibusmensuraeitinerumetregionissituspicturadescribebantur,utagresteingeniohominescertiusdeliberatacognoscerent.&rdquo（&ldquoParchmentswerepublished,onwhichthedistancesoftheroutesandapictureofthestructureoftheregionweredrawn,sothatevenmenwithuntrainedabilitymightknowtheplansmoredefinitely.&rdquo）Itisnoteworthythatinthiswayattemptsweremadetoassistthepeasants'lackofeducation.
2.Jähns，2：1151.
3.&ldquoHewhohasthelastpieceofbreadandthelastcrownisvictorious.&rdquoGaspard（Jean）deSaulx-Tavannes,Mémoires,Ed.Buchon，1836.p.226.Mendoza,p.11：&ldquoConsequently,itiscustomarilysaidthatthelastcrownorpennyholdsthevictory.&rdquo
WhenFrederickplannedtobeginthewarin1756，heestimatedthateachcampaignwouldcosthim5milliontalersandthatPrussiatogetherwithSaxony,whichheplannedtoconquer,couldaffordthat.Theexpensesincreased,however,to15milliontalersannually,andhehadtorequestEnglishsubsidies.MariaTheresawagedwaressentiallywithFrenchsubsidies,butin1761shehadusedupherresourcessocompletelythatevenduringthecontinuingwarshereducedthearmyanddischargedtroopsforreasonsofeconomy.
4.Thesepassagesaretobefoundin&ldquoFredericktheGreat'sIdeasonWar&rdquo（&ldquoFriedrichsdesGrossenAnschauungenvomKriege&rdquo），Vol.27oftheKriegsgeschichtlicheEinzelschriften,p.268.
5.Jochim，&ldquoTheMilitaryTestamentoftheGreatKing&rdquo（&ldquoDasmilitärischeTestamentdesGrossenKönigs&rdquo），supplementtotheMilitär-Wochenblatt，1914，pp.269，278.
6.Lenz,HistorischeZeitschrift，49：458.
7.SchmalkaldicWar（SchmalkaldischerKrieg），Germanedition，1853，p.90.
8.EvenbeforethestartoftheSchmalkaldicWar,theVenetianambassadorreportedthattheemperorwouldnotfightanybattle.Inthisconnectionhenoted:&ldquo...Protestantsdonothavecaptains...theGermannationaloneisnotsuitabletodobattleonitsownwithdetermination,andtheemperorwillavoidthatbutwillprobeandencircletheenemyarmywithhislightcavalry,andwiththeItalianinfantry（whichisexperiencedinthebusinessofwar）hewillattempttodrivethemback,wearthemout,andannihilatethem.&rdquoBern.Navagero,ReportfromGermanyofJuly1546（RelationausDeutschlandvomJuli1546），Ed.Albèri,Series1，1：362.
9.ViktorLöwe,TheOrganizationandAdministrationofWallenstein'sArmies（DieOrganisationundVerwaltungderWallensteinschenHeere），1895.ReviewedbySchrötterinSchmollersJahrbücher，1895，Vol.19，Book4，p.327.Konze，&ldquoTheStrengthsetc.ofWallenstein'sArmyin1633&rdquo（&ldquoDieStärkeuswderWallensteinschenArmeeimJahre1633&rdquo），Bonndissertation，1906.Hoeniger，&ldquoTheArmiesoftheThirtyYears'War&rdquo（&ldquoDieArmeendes30jährigenKrieges&rdquo），supplementtotheMilitär-Wochenblatt，1914，Vol.7，claimsthatattheclimaxofthewar,whenGustavusAdolphusandWallensteinstoodfacingoneanother,onbothsidestogethertherewasatotalofbetween260，000and280，000menunderarms.Thatestimateiscertainlysomewhathigh.Hoenigergavetoohighastrengthtothearmies,especiallyatNuremberg.
10.AccordingtoDeuticke,SchlachtbeiLützen,p.52.
11.ForthetrainandrationsamongtheSwiss,seeElgger,MilitarySystemoftheSwiss（KriegswesenderSchweizer），p.117ff.
12.Jähns,pp.502，505.
13.Jähns,p.521.
14.Knaake,ContributionstotheHistoryofEmperorCharlesV（BeiträgezurGeschichteKaiserKarlsV.），Stendal，1864，p.11.
15.Spont,Revuedesquestionsd'histoire，22（1899）：63.
16.SeealsoRudolfSchmidt,SchlachtbeiWittstock,p.49.LetterofFieldMarshalHatzfeld.Alsop.57.
17.Daniels,PreussischeJahrbücher，78：487.In1757，whenCumberland'sarmywasmaraudingbecauseofashortageofrations,heorderedthatthehighprovostwastohavehangedwithoutceremonyeverysoldiercaughtintheact.Apriestaccompaniedhimasherodeabout,inordertocomfortthepoorsinnersbeforetheywenttohell.Daniels,PreussischeJahrbücher，77：478.
18.Montecuccoli,Writings（Schriften），2：122，statesthatin1648theSwedesheldninefortressesinSilesia.Theyhadwonthemveryeasily,sincetheywerenotoccupied,andtheyhadthendevelopedtheinsignificantolderworks.ForthisreasonMontecuccoliadvisesthatoneshoulddemolishalltheold,unimportantfortressesandholdonlyafewreallygoodfortresses,orhaveonlyopencities.Heanticipatesgarrisonsofonly100to500men,exceptforPrague,whichwastohave1，500.Onpage135heexplainshowthemanyfortressesweredetrimentaltotheSpaniardsintheNetherlandsbecausetheycouldnotsatisfactorilyoccupyandfeedallofthem,whereastheywereusefulfortheNetherlandersbecausetheywerenaturallystrongpositionsandtheinhabitantsthemselvesprovidedthenecessarydefenders.
19.PrintedinthePreussischeJahrbücher，153（1913）：423.
20.Henckel,MilitaryTestament（MilitärischerNachlass），2：79.
21.ThisisexcellentlydescribedintheKriegsgeschichtlicheEinzelschriften，27：364.On23December1757ColonelMarainvillereportedofFrederick'stactics:&ldquo...hedoesnotfollowuphisadvantages.Whenhewinsbattles,helimitshimselfalmostalwaystopossessionofthebattlefield.&rdquoQuotedinStuhr,ResearchandClarificationsoftheHistoryoftheSevenYears'War（ForschungenundErläuterungenzurGeschichtedes7jährigenKrieges），1：387.
22.This,too,isexcellentlydescribedintheKriegsgeschichtlicheEinzelschriften，27：353.
23.DetailsonwinterquartersorwintercampaignsinFrederick'sGeneral-Prinzipien,Articles27and28.
24.Here,too,aswehavealreadyseenaboveinthequotationfromHöpfner（p.279），isareasonfortheobliquebattleformation.
25.ArchivesofOrange-Nassau，2dSeries，2：378.
26.QuotedinKrebs,BattleontheWhiteMountain（SchlachtamweissenBerge），p.12.
27.TheCampaignsofPrinceEugene（DieFeldzügedesPrinzenEugen），1：1：587.
28.AccordingtothecitationinKriegsgeschichtlicheEinzelschriften，27：385.
29.LettertoLouisXVdated12July1744.LettertotheprinceofPrussiaforwardingtheGeneral-Prinzipien.
6 戰略概述及戰例介紹
1.AllthepreviousdescriptionsofthiscampaignandofthebattlehavebeensignificantlycorrectedbythecarefulstudywithitscriticalanalysisofthesourcesbyRudolfIsrael，&ldquoTheCampaignof1704inSouthGermany&rdquo（&ldquoDerFeldzugvon1704inSüddeutschland&rdquo），Berlindissertation，1913.
2.Ofcourse,Tallartintendedtoattackthealliesassoonastheyhadcrossedthroughthemistmovingacrosshisfront,andhealsomadeafewmovementstowardattackinginthebattle.Butinviewoftheformationofhistroops,especiallytheunusuallystrongoccupationofBlindheimandthelackofareserve,wecanstillsaythatthebattlewasplannedasapurelydefensiveaction.
3.ThebattlewasfirstcompletelyexplainedinitsstrategicaswellastacticalsequencebyGeorgSchmoller，&ldquoTheCampaignof1706inItaly&rdquo（&ldquoDerFeldzugvon1706inItalien&rdquo），Berlindissertation，1909.
4.Schmoller,pp.35-36，&ldquoTheHussarsinfrontofthetwoEchelonsofCavalry.&rdquo
5.FranzMühlhoff，&ldquoTheGenesisoftheBattleofOudenarde&rdquo（&ldquoDieGenesisderSchlachtbeiOudenaarde&rdquo），Berlindissertation，1914.
6.InCoxe,LifeandCorrespondenceofMarlborough（LebenundBriefwechselMarlboroughs）.
7.Thebattleistreatedexcellentlyinthe1912BerlindissertationbyWalterSchwerdtfeger.ItistobenotedparticularlythattheaccountbyRüstowintheGeschichtederInfanterieiscorrectedandexpandedinveryimportantpointsbythisstudy.Sautai,too,BatailledeMalplaquet（1906），hadalreadyrejectedRüstow'saccount.
8.ThewarsofFredericktheGreathaverecentlybeentreatedcomprehensivelybyboththePrussianandtheAustriangeneralstaffs.ThePrussianworksuffersfromafalsebasicconceptofthestrategyoftheperiod,whichhasalsopresentedmanydetailsinafalselight.ThetwogeneralstaffworkshavebeencomparedinanexcellentarticlebyOttoHerrmannintheJahrbücherfürdieArmeeundMarine,January，1906.
9.TheGeneralstabswerk,p.392，statesthattheopposingstrengthsinthebattlewere&ldquonotsignificantlydifferentfromoneanother，&rdquobutitestimatesthePrussianinfantry1，200mentoolowandtheAustriancavalry1，800horsestoohigh.Furthermore,itdoesnotatalltakeintoconsiderationthefactthatthePrussiansalsohad1，400cavalryinpositionintherearoftheAustriansatOhlau,whocouldbecountedontointerveneinthebattle,andalsoacorpsofsevenbattalionsandsixsquadrons,aswellasfivesquadronsfromthehomeland.
10.IntheintroductiontothesecondvolumeoftheGen-eralstabswerk,theunsatisfactoryexploitationofthePrussianvictoryisretroactivelyexplainedbythe&ldquoheavylossesoftroops,whichinfluencedmostdeeplythecommander'seasilyexcitedspirit&rdquoandsimilarreasons,butthegreatnumericalsuperiorityofthePrussiansremainsunmentioned.
11.HowimportantthisviewpointwasforFrederickisexplainedbySenftner，&ldquoSaxonyandPrussiain1741&rdquo（&ldquoSachsenundPreussenimJahre1741&rdquo），Berlindissertation，1904.
12.MonographbyPaulMüller.Berlindissertation，1905.AccordingtotheAustrianGeneralstabswerk，3：670，FrederickdidnotpushhissuccesstoacompletevictorybecauseforpoliticalreasonshewishedtospareAustria.ThatwouldbethedirectoppositeofthestrategythatisnormallyattributedtoFrederick,butitseemstometogotoofarwhenitdrawsthepoliticalmotiveintothetacticalaction.Itwassufficientthatthevictorywasnotfurtherpursuedstrategically.TheGeneralstabswerkistobecomparedwiththeverydifferentaccountinKoser,FriedrichderGrosse,andBleich，&ldquoTheMoravianCampaign，1741-42&rdquo（&ldquoDermährischeFeldzug1741-42&rdquo），Rostockdissertation，1901.IagreewithKoserwithrespecttothefacts,butIevaluatethemverydifferentlyfromthestrategicviewpoint.Bleich,too,hasnotyethituponthecorrectpointsofview.
13.TheaccountofthebattleintheGeneralstabswerkhasbeencorrectedinmanyrespects,includingthearmystrengths,inthecomprehensivemonographbyRudolfKeibel（1899）.ThereproachconcerningtheunsatisfactorypursuitthatisdirectedagainstthekingintheGeneralstabswerkisrejectedbyOskarSchulzin&ldquoFrederick'sCampaignaftertheBattleofHohenfriedberguptotheEveoftheBattleofSoor&rdquo（&ldquoDerFeldzugFriedrichsnachderSchlachtbeiHohenfriedbergbiszumVorabendderSchlachtbeiSoor&rdquo），Heidelbergdissertation，1901.
14.InthissayingliesthekeytounderstandingthebattleofSoor,which,althoughitwasalreadycorrectlyrecognizedbyClausewitz（10：30），ismissingintheGeneralstabswerk.HansStabenow，&ldquoDieSchlachtbeiSoor，&rdquoBerlindissertation，1901.
15.ThispointhasbeenstronglyconfirmedindetailbyHansKania，&ldquoTheConductofPrinceLeopoldbeforetheBattleofKesselsdorf&rdquo（&ldquoDasVerhaltendesFürstenLeopoldvorderSchlachtbeiKesselsdorf&rdquo），Berlindissertation，1901.
16.IwanJowanowitsch，&ldquoWhyDidFredericktheGreatnotParticipateintheBattleofKesselsdorf?&rdquo（&ldquoWarumhatFriedrichderGrosseanderSchlachtbeiKesselsdorfnichtteilgenommen?&rdquo），Berlindissertation，1901.
17.Hobohm，&ldquoTorstenssonasPredecessorofFredericktheGreatintheStruggleAgainstAustria&rdquo（&ldquoTorstenssonalsVorgängerFriedrichsdesGrossenimKampfgegenOesterreich&rdquo），PreussischeJahrbücher，153：423ff.
18.MonographbyPaulGantzerintheMitteilungendesVereinsderGeschichtederDeutscheninBöhmen,Vol.43（1905）.
19.Clausewitz,Werke，9：6.
20.Hobohm,p.436.
21.Sarauw,TheCampaignsofCharlesXII（DieFeldzügeKarlsXII.），1881，p.192.
22.FranzQuandt，&ldquoDieSchlachtbeiLobositz，&rdquoBerlindissertation，1909.TheGeneralstabswerkstilldoesnotpresentthingscorrectly.
23.KarlGrawe，&ldquoTheDevelopmentofthePrussianCampaignPlanintheSpringof1757&rdquo（&ldquoDieEntwicklungdespreussischenFeldzugsplanesimFrühjahr1757&rdquo），Berlindissertation，1903.Thiswork,whichinotherrespectsdevelopsthesequencecorrectly,makesthemistakeofsimplynamingLeitmeritzasamarchobjectiveintheking'sordertoSchwerinof3April,whereasbothMelnikand,on17April,Reudnitzarenamed.
24.ThathasalreadybeenprovedinanoutstandingwaybyCaemmerer,FredericktheGreat'sCampaignPlanfortheYear1757（FriedrichsdesGrossenFeldzugsplanfürdasJahr1757），1883，which,inotherrespects,challengesmyconcept.
25.Jany,DocumentaryContributionsandStudiesontheHistoryofthePrussianArmy（UrkundlicheBeiträgeundForschungenzurGeschichtedespreussischenHeeres），publishedbytheGreatGeneralStaff，3（1901）：35.
26.TheoppositeconceptwasrepresentedprincipallybyAlbertNaudé，whoseargumentshavebeenthoroughlyrefutedbymeinthePreussischeJahrbücher，73：151；74：570（1893）.SeeinthisconnectionthearticlebyGustavRoloffintheDeutscheHeereszeitung,Nos.42and43，1894.
27.CreditforhavingclarifiedtheseconditionsgoestoDietrichGoslich，&ldquoDieSchlachtbeiKollin，&rdquoBerlindissertation，1911.SeealsothereviewintheDeutscheLiteraturzeitungof1May1915，No.18.SeealsoJahrbücherfürArmeeundMarine,March1912，p.336.Ifinthisarticletheauthor,Jany,jokinglyreferstoFrederick'sconcernforhisdepotasthelossof&ldquofloursacks，&rdquowhichcouldnotbecomparedwiththegainsfromabattle,hemisunderstandsabasicprincipleofthePrussianmilitarysystemandFrederick'sstrategy.ForNapoleon,theproposalnottofightatKollinbuttoallowDauntoapproachstillcloserwassimpleandnatural.NothingismorecharacteristicofFrederickthanthatfromthestartherejectedthisideabecauseofhisconcernforhisrations.ThispointisdevelopedverywellbyGoslichandmisunderstoodbyJany.
Morerecently,therehasappearedanAustrianaccountofthebattlebyvonHoen,Vienna（1911），whichconfirmsGoslich'sconclusionsfromtheAustriansourcesandaddssomeveryinterestingnewpoints.AcriticalreviewofthisworkthatpresentsanexcellentpicturehasbeengivenbyOttoHerrmannintheBrandenburgisch-PreussischeForschungen，16（1913）：145.
28.Gerber,DieSchlachtbeiLeuthen,Berlin，1901，hastherightconcept.TheGeneralstabswerkisoffbaseinmanyrespects.
29.Arneth，5：172.
30.Masslowski,TheSevenYears'WarfromtheRussianViewpoint（Dersiebenj&au