注釋
關燈
小
中
大
rchinstepLodronodidlikewise（Jähns，1：724）.SeealsoHobohm，2：407.InareportonthebattleofCeresolebyBernardoSpina,publishedbyStallwitzasasupplementtohisdocumentonthatbattle（Berlindissertation，1911，p.54），itisstatedthattheSpanishgeneraldelGuastohadtherecruitsdrilledimmediatelybeforethebattle.ItisalsoreportedthattheFrenchguardshadconducteddrills.
5.Jähns，1：735.
6.Dilich,Kriegsbuch，1607，p.254，discussesthestepstakentomaintaintheformationonthemarch.Amongthemhesays&ldquothatinmarching,anevenandsteadystepistobemaintained&rdquoand&ldquothatthedrummersmaintainacorrectbeatasifthesoldierhadtodancebyit.&rdquo
7.InMarch1591thisproportionwas1：0.47.Mulder,prefacetoDuyck'sJournal，1：51ff.，1862.Hearrivesatthisnumberbytakingtheaverageofalargenumberofindividualfiguresinthedocuments，figuresthatcannotbeconfirmed.
8.AccordingtothesketchesbyJohnofNassau,tworanksofmusketeersweredrawnupforwardofthefrontofthe&ldquodouble-paymen，&rdquothatis,thepikemen.Plathner，&ldquoGrafJohannvonNassau，&rdquoBerlindissertation，1913，p.57.
9.Dilich,Kriegsbuch，1607，p.290，isnotveryclearastowhatissupposedtohappenwhenaformationofpikemenandmarksmenisattackedbymountedmenorpikemen.Theyshouldeitherretirebehindthepikemenorintothemassofthem.
10.StuttgartManuscriptof1612.Jähns，2：924.JohnofNassaustatesthatMauriceneverallowedhissystemofmarchandbattleformationtobechanged,onceithadbeenestablished,sothatmerelybydrumandtrumpetsignalseachmancouldtakehisplace.Plathner,p.58.
11.Plathner,p.57.
12.AletterfromSandolintoLipsius,dated16July1595.CitedinJähns，2：880.DukeHenriRohanreportedlaterinhisdocument（citedinJähns，2：951）thatMauricehadfoundthatthearmamentwithshieldswasbetterbuthadnotbeenabletohavehisopinionaccepted,since,ofcourse,hewasnotthesovereign.SeeHobohm，2：452.
13.Mulder,VanDuyck'sJournal，1：636ff.From9Augustto26October1595.Similarlyin1598.Reyd,NiederländischeGeschichte,Vol.XV,Ed.1626，p.569.InthesameyearthebrotherofWilliamLouis,JohnofNassau,reportedfromGroningentotheirfatherondrillsinthegarrisons.ArchivesofOranien-Nassau，2dSeries，2：403.Wallhausen,KriegskunstzuFuss,p.23，reproachesthosewhosay:&ldquoWhatisdrilling?Whenoneisfightingfortheenemy,onedoesnotdrilllong.&rdquo
14.ChaptersIVandVIIandaparticularparagraph，144，ofChapterXVIIIareerroneouslyidentifiedintheletterasFolio144.Thethreeechelonsareprescribedinit：&ldquoHastrèsaciesadusumseparatas,propinquitateconjunctas,adsemutuoadjuvandasidoneasesseperspeximus&rdquo（&ldquoWeobservedthatthesethreebattlelines,separatedforuseandjoinedbytheirproximity,aresuitabletoaideachothermutually&rdquo）.ThedepthoftheechelonsisgivenastenmeninLeo.Itisinterestingtonote,incidentally,howunderstandingandmisunderstandingareoftenconfused.Inarathercarelessway,LeotransferredthetraditionconcerningtheRomaninfantry（whicheventuallygoesbacktoLivy，8.8）tothecavalry.ButthisattractedsolittleattentionthatWilliamLouis,apparentlywithoutnoticingLeo'serror,wasabletotransferitbackagaintotheinfantry.
15.AsetofinstructionsforthetrainingoftheindividualmanwasHandlingoftheGuns,Muskets,andSpears（WaffenhandlungvondenRören,MusquetenundSpiessen）byJacobdeGeyn.TheHague，1608.DedicatedtoJoachimErnst,MargraveofBrandenburg.Thebookisillustratedwithlarge,handsomecopperplates.Republishedin1640.ThecopperplatesinWallhausen'sKriegskunstzuFussaredifferentones,alsoquiteoftendifferentintheirarrangement.Geyndistinguishesbetweenmarksmenandmusketeershehasforty-twocommandsfortheformerandforty-threeforthelatter.Themusketeershavewoodenpowdercontainersonbandoliers,whilethemarksmendonot.Forthespearmentherearetwenty-onecommands,manyofthemtobecarriedoutinthreespeeds.
16.Rüstow，1：345，characterizesMaurice'sreformsashavingsimplifiedtothemaximumthetacticalformations.Thisseemstobethedirectoppositeofmydescription,totheextentthatIseeinthenewformationssomethingthathadtobeworkedoutandwasnotatallsimplebutpossibleonlythroughhardwork.Butthedifferenceisapparentratherthanreal.Rüstowisthinkingofthoseartificialtheoreticalformationswhichhethoroughlydiscusses,likethecrossbattalionandtheeight-corneredunittheywerenothingmorethaningeniouscontrivancesandneverplayedaroleinactualpractice.Andincomparisonwiththis,theNetherlandishformationwas,ofcourse,asimplification.Incomparisonwiththesquareofmenorthegeometricsquare,whichuptothatpointweretheonlyonesunderpracticalconsideration,theNetherlandishmethodwasnotasimplificationbutafar-reachingrefinement,anditisonlywiththisexplanationthatthehistoricalprogressisplacedintherightlight.
17.JohnofNassaugives135asthenormalnumber,ofwhich45havethelongspearand74aremusketeersandmarksmen.Plathner,p.40.
18.EverardusReidanus,Belgarumaliarumquegentiumannales（AnnalsoftheBelgiansandotherNations），Leyden，1633，8：192.Emmius,GuilelmusLudovieus（WilliamLouis），1621，p.67.SeealsoMulder'sprefacetoDuyck'sJournal，1：16.
19.Krebs,BattleontheWhiteMountain（SchlachtandemWeissenBerge），p.25ff.
20.Reyd,p.281.
21.Billon,p.191.
22.Maurice（19June1593），Archives-Oranien-Nassau，2dSeries，1：24.
23.PrintedintheWorksoftheHistoricalSociety（HistorischGenootschap）inUtrecht.Newseries,No.37.Utrecht，1883，p.448ff.
4 古斯塔夫·阿道夫
1.Fahlbeck,PreussischeJahrbücher，133：535.
2.AccordingtoG.Droysen,GustavAdolf，2：85，thekinglandedinPomeraniain1630
with13，000men
HealreadyhadinStralsund6，000
Follow-upforcesca.7，000
WithdrawnfromPrussia13，600
Total:approximately40，000
Some36，000menremainedbehindinSweden,Finland,Prussia,andsoforth.Consequently,theentiremilitarystrengthamountedto76，000men，43，000ofwhomwereleviednationals.
3.Jähns，2：952.
4.Inhiswritingsoftheyear1673（Schriften，2：672），Montecuccoliactuallyconsiderstheusualratiooftwo-thirdsmusketeersandone-thirdpikementobewrong.Hebelievesmorepikemenareneededtocoverthemusketeersinbattle,forthelatter,alone,wouldbeoverpoweredbythecavalry.HepointsoutthatthiswaswhathappenedatLens,forexample,whereCondédefeatedtheLotharingians.AtBreitenfeld,hesays,theHolsteinregimentheldfastbecauseofitspikemenuntilitwasovercomebytheartillery.Hereportsthesamethingin2：223.Heclaimsthattheratiooftwo-thirdstoone-thirdwasacceptableonlybecauseonsomanyoccasionsoutsideofbattlethemusketeersweremoreusefulthanthepikemen.
5.&ldquoTheSwedishDiscipline，&rdquocitedinFirth,Cromwell'sArmy,p.105.
6.AccordingtoFirth,p.104.
7.Firth,Cromwell'sArmy,p.98，fromtheSwedishIntelligencer，1：124.
8.Ontheleathercannon,seeGohlkeintheZeitschriftfürhistorischeWaffenkunde，4：392，andFeldhaus,p.121.&ldquoLeatherpieces&rdquoarealsomentionedintheintroductorypoemtotheLittleWarBook（Kriegsbüchlein）ofLavaterofZurich，1644.HesaystheydidnotcomefirstfromSwedentoZurich，&ldquobutratherfromustothem.&rdquo
9.LettertoAldringer，2January1633，reproducedinFörster,Wallenstein'sLetters（WallensteinsBriefe）.Daniel'sstatementinHistoryoftheMilitary（GeschichtedesKriegswesens），5：12，thatHenryIVofFrancehadalreadyrequiredthathissquadronsfireasinglesalvowiththeirpistolsandthenattackwithcoldsteel,mustbebasedonamisunderstanding.Ihavefoundnothingonthisinthesources,andtheobjectiveprerequisiteforsuchactionismissing,thatis,astricterdiscipline.DavilastatesexpresslythatatIvry,thelastlargebattleofHenryIV,hissquadronsusedthecaracole.
10.ThisexplanationhasbeenpreservedforusintheworkofanEnglishmilitaryauthor,Turner,anditgoesbacktoEnglishofficerswhohadservedunderGustavusAdolphus.IdrawthequotationfromFirth,Cromwell'sArmy,p.289.ThepassagescitedinMareks,Coligny,p.56，andHobohm,Machiavelli，2：373，385，whichseemtoproveanearlieroccurrenceoftherunningofthespeargauntlet&mdashespeciallyBouchet,Preuvesdel'histoiredel'illustremaisondeColigny（EvidenceontheHistoryoftheIllustriousHouseofColigny），1642，p.457&mdasharebasedonerroneoustranslations.&ldquoPasserparlespiques&rdquo（&ldquotopassbeforethepikes&rdquo）isthe&ldquolawofthelongspears，&rdquomentionedonp.61above.Ofcourse,LaCurnedeSt.Palaye,Dictionnairedel'ancienlangagefrançais,Vol.8，understandsthisexpressionasmeaningstrikingwiththespearshafts.Iconsiderthatimpossiblethespearsaretoolongtobeusedthatway.
11.CitedinFirth,Cromwell'sArmy,p.321.
5 克倫威爾
1.TheoutstandingbookbyC.H.Firth,Cromwell'sArmy,London，1902，coversexhaustivelythesubjectofCromwellasamilitaryorganizer,theroleinwhichheisofmostinteresttous.TheextensiveworkbyFritzHoenig,OliverCromwell,Berlin，1887，isnotuptopar.SeethereviewintheHistorischeZeitschrift，63：482，andtheHistoricalReview,Vol.15（1889），19，p.599.ItwasonlyinhislaterwritingsthatHoenigbroughthisconsiderabletalenttoitsfulldevelopment.
2.AccordingtoHoenig,II，2，269，thiscommandoriginatedin1643.
3.AccordingtoanestimatebyW.G.Ross,reportedintheHistorischeZeitschrift，63（1889）：484，theparliamentaryarmynumbered13，500men,including7，000infantry,whereastheroyalarmyhadonly8，000men,halfinfantryandhalfcavalry.SeeFirth,p.111.
4.HoenigattributedtoCromwellspecificcreationsinthetacticalemploymentofcavalry,theformationofechelons,andsoon,andsawinhimthepredecessorofFrederickandSeydlitzandeventheguidingspiritforourtime.Icannotagreewithhimonthis.Theentireorganizationofmilitaryunitsoftheseventeenthcenturywiththematterofeffectivenessoftheirweaponsistoodifferentfromtheconditionsoftheeighteenthandnineteenthcenturiestojustifysuchcomparisons.Hoenigisalsoinerror（I，2，247）whenheattributestoCromwelltheformationofdivisionsintheNapoleonicsense.
5.Firth,p.101.
6.Seemyarticle&ldquoAnglicanismandPresbyterianism&rdquointheHistorisch-PolitischeAufsätze.
6 戰例介紹
1.H.vonKoss，&ldquoTheBattlesofSt.QuentinandGravelingen&rdquo（&ldquoDieSchlachtenbeiSt.QuentinundGravelingen&rdquo），Berlindissertation，1914，E.EberingPress.IamnotsosurewhethertheanalysisofGravelingeninthisotherwiseveryworthwhileworkisappropriate.ThepointsraisedbyElkanagainstthisworkinhisreviewintheHistorischeZeitschrift，116：533，applyonlytosecondaryitems,partlysimpletypographicalerrors.Thequestion,too,oftheinterventionoftheEnglishships,whichKoss,withgoodreasons,doubts,isnotsignificantfromthemilitaryhistoryviewpoint,but,onthebasisoftestimonycitedbyElkanandoverlookedbyKoss,thispointcallsforfurtherstudy.
2.SwissbattlereportsinSegesser,LudwigPfyfferandHisTimes（LudwigPfyfferundseineZeit），1：621.
3.SpecialstudyonthebattlebyGigon,Latroisièmeguerredereligion，1912.GigongivestheHuguenotsastrengthof12，000infantryand7，000cavalryandtheCatholics15，000infantryand8，000cavalry.OtherwritersassumeconsiderablyhighernumbersfortheCatholics.AccordingtoPopelinière,Colignysupposedlyusedthemethodofblendingtheinfantryandthecavalry（&ldquod'enlacerl'infanterieetlacavallerie&rdquo）insmallunits.Theaccountofthebattle,however,doesnotshowthat.
4.ThestandardmonographisbyJ.Krebs,Berlin，1879.Brendel，1875，givesnothingusefulfromamilitarystandpoint.AfewdetailsaretobefoundinRiezler,SitzungsberichtederMünchenerAkademie,Phil.Abt.，Vol.23，1906.
5.Riezler,p.84，ofcourseassumesthatthearmyoftheLeaguewasonly10，000menstrongandhadlose12，000to15，000menfromsicknessintheprecedingcampaign.The&ldquoHungarianfever&rdquowasragingatthattimeinallcamps.
6.AccordingtoAnhalt,theformationoftheBohemianswas3，750paceswideatmost,anditappearsasiftheanimalparkwasnotincludedinthatfigure.AccordingtotheillustrationinKrebs,however,thewidthwasnoteven2，000meters,includingthepositionintheanimalpark,and,remarkablyenough,thiswasestimatedonthesamescaleasequalto5，000feet.Onpage171Krebsassumesthatthefrontwasabout3，600meters.Inanycase,thefrontwasverylongforthesmallarmy.
7.Later,TillyreproachedhiscolleagueBuquoiforhavingdivideduphishorsemeninto&ldquolittlesquadrons&rdquo（&ldquosquadronelli&rdquo）.
8.InhisreportChristianspeaksonlyofThurn'smusketeers,asiftherewerenopikementhereatall.
9.AccordingtoGindely，2：119，theunits（Fähnlein）oftheBohemianregimentswerecomposedof24privatesfirstclass，76pikemen,and200musketeers.
10.ThestandardspecialstudyonthebattleisbyWalterOpitz（Leipzig,A.Deichert，1892）.ThedissertationbyWangerin,Halle，1896，isonlyastudyofthesourceswithoutsignificantconclusions.
11.Opitz,p.76，establishedthefactthatTillywantedtomovefromLeipzigtotheElbe,inordertogainacrossingandtodrawFieldMarshalTiefenbachtohimfromSilesia.Oncehehadthislatterforce,PappenheimwastobedetachedtoMecklenburgintherearoftheSwedishking.Thatwastheplanincasetheenemyagainavoidedbattle.ForthebattleitselftheplanwasonlysignificanttotheextentthatitmayhavecontributedtothefactthattheydidnotwanttogobackbehindtheElstertoawaitAldringer.
12.Jähns,HistoryofMilitarySciences（GeschichtederKriegswissenschaften），1：572.
13.FollowingRüstow'ssample,OpitzhasTilly'sinfantryarrangedintheformofaSpanishbrigade.Itmaybethattheywereformedthiswayforamoment.Itisnotreported,and,ofcourse,itdoesnotmattertactically,sinceintheirmovementforwarditwouldhavebeenneitherpossiblenoradvantageoustoholdthefourunitstogetherinsomekindofprescribedfigure.ItisexpresslystatedinaFrenchreportandinChemnitz（Opitz,p.92）thatTilly'sentirearmystoodinasingleechelon,andMontecuccoli,Writings，2：581，saysthatTillywasdefeatedatLeipzigmainlybecausehehaddrawnuphisentirearmyinasingle,right-angledfrontwithoutreserves.Thediscrepancythat,accordingtoFieldMarshalHorn'sreport,Tilly'sinfantrywasalignedinfourbattalions,whereastheFrenchreportstatesfourteenbattalions（Opitz,p.93），canprobablybeexplainedbythefactthatinthelatterfigurethecavalryformationsarealsocountedasbattalions.Furthermore,asintheinfantry,severalregimentsofcavalrymayhavebeenassembledinasingletacticalunit.
14.Inhissketch,OpitzobviouslyshowstheSwedesasmuchtoowide,theSaxonsastoonarrow.Sinceitisreportedofbothformationsthattheywereagood21/2mileswide（extractfromSchreiber'sreportof8September.Droysen,ArchivesforSaxonHistory[ArchivfürsächsischeGeschichte]，7：348）andtherightflankoftheSwedesextendedbeyondtheenemyflank,thentheimperialrightflankmustnodoubthaveextendedbeyondtheenemyflank,theSaxons.
15.Montecuccoli,Works，2：579，statesthattheprincipalreasonfortheSwedishvictorywasthattheyplacedthemusketeersbetweenthecavalry.Thecavalryhadtobesoformedthattheenemyfirsthadtopassthroughthemusketfire,andintheweakenedconditionintowhichthatbroughthim,hewasthenattackedbythecavalry.
16.Thisactionbytheartilleryisnotmentionedintheactualbattlereports,butitdoesappearinChemnitzandMontecuccoli.ThisisconsistentwiththefactthatTilly,inhisvariousreports（Droysen,ArchivesforSaxonHistory，7：391-392），stronglyemphasizedtheenemy'ssuperiorityinartillery.
17.KarlDeuticke，&ldquoTheBattleofLützen&rdquo（&ldquoDieSchlachtbeiLützen&rdquo），Giessendissertation，1917.Itwasnotuntiltheappearanceofthisexcellentstudy,inwhichthescatteredsources,especiallyletters,werecollectedandstudiedwiththegreatestcarewiththehelpoftheStockholmLibrary,thatacorrectandreliablepictureofthedetailsofthisbattlewasachieved.
18.ItisnotdefinitelyreportedastowhetherWallensteinhadadditionallightpiecesalongwithhistwenty-oneheavycannon.WeonlyknowfromseverallettersintheFontesrerumaustriacarum（SourcesofAustrianHistory），Vol.65，thathehadprocuredsuchcannon.
19.Deuticke,p.67.
20.Unfortunately,wedonothaveinformationonthestrengthofthiscorpsitcanhardlyhavebeenmorethan6，000men.OnthedayofthebattleitwasstillatTorgauandwouldthereforenothavebeenabletoreachthevicinityofLützenforseveraldays.GustavusAdolphushadorderedittofollowtherouteviaRiesaandOschatzinordertoavoidEilenburgandLeipzig,whichwereoccupiedbytheemperor'sforces.
21.Themorerecentmonographsonthisbattle,onwhichmyaccountisbased,areprincipallythoseofWalterStruck,Stralsund，1893，andErichLeo,Halle，1900.Butneitherofthemdistinguishessufficientlybetweenapositivedecisiontoseekthebattleandthemereriskofbringingonthebattleastheresultofamaneuver.NorhasthelivelydescriptionofthebattlebyColonelKaiserintheLiterarischeBeilagedesStaatsanzeigersfürWürttemberg，1897，cometogripswiththisdecisivepoint.ItwasonlylaterthatIbecameacquaintedwith&ldquoFromLützentoNördlingen&rdquo（&ldquoVonLützennachNördlingen&rdquo）byKarlJacob（1904），whoseekstoprovethatBernhardvonWeimarwasunjustlyexaltedandSwedishFieldMarshalHornwasamuchbetterstrategist.WhatJacobsaysinHorn'sfavormaywellbeessentiallycorrect,buthispejorativejudgmentofBernhardshowsprejudiceandinsufficienttraininginmilitaryhistory.InthepointsofcontroversybetweenLeoandStruck,JacobcorrectlysidesstronglywithStruck.
22.JacobcriticizesBernhardforattackingatall.Hebelievesthatwingshouldhavemaintainedapurelydefensivestanceinordertocoverapossiblewithdrawalwithitsfullstrengthstillavailable.SuchconductwouldhavebeenpoortestimonyforthemilitarygeniusofBernhard.Ofcourse,sincethebattlewaslost,thedefeatwasallthemorefrightfulinthatBernhardhadinsufficientreservestosendintocoverthewithdrawal.Nevertheless,ifhehadremainedpassiveinthebattleforthiseventuality,avictorywouldhavebeenimpossible,sincetheenemycouldthenhavehadallthemoretroopstoemployagainstHorn.Fromallappearances,Bernhardunderstoodhismissionabsolutelycorrectly&mdashtokeeptheenemyonhisflankasoccupiedaspossiblebutwithoutbringingonthedecisivebattlethere.
23.Leo,p.59，estimatesthestrengthoftheCatholicarmybetween40，000and50，000men,asmallportionofwhichremainedinpositionfacingNördlingen,whileheconsidersthestrengthoftheSwedesbetween19，000and22，000regularsand5，000to6，000Württembergmilitia.M.Ritter,HistoryoftheThirtyYears'War（GeschichtedesDreissigjährigenKrieges），p.580，agreeswiththeseestimates,asdoesJacob,p.109.Unfortunately,welearnnothingspecificabouttheemploymentandconductofthismilitiainthebattle.ItmusthavebeeninpositiononBernhard'sflankandthereforeprobablyremainedunengagedintheactualbattlebutwasovertakenbytheenemyonthewithdrawalandcutdown.EveninKaiser'saccount,wherewewouldmostlikelyexpectit,thereisnothingfurtherofanysignificance.
24.Leo,p.66，note,citesseveralsourcestotheeffectthatBernhardfromtheverystart&mdashthatis,asearlyasinthecouncilofwarthatdecidedonthemarchontotheArnsberg&mdashwishedtobringonthedecisivebattleandsorecommended.ButLeo'ssourcesarenotcompletelyreliable,anditcould,forexample,easilybethecasethatremarksbytheprinceontheeveningofthemarchorthemorningofthebattle,whenitwasaquestionofwhetherornottheyshouldseektotaketheAllbuchpositionbyforce,weretransposedbacktothecouncilofwar.
25.TheauthoritativemonographisRudolfSchmidt's&ldquoTheBattleofWittstock&rdquo（&ldquoDieSchlachtbeiWittstock&rdquo），Halle，1876.
26.LettertoFieldMarshalCountGötz,whowasincommandinHesse,dated9October,andthereforefivedaysafterthebattle.QuotedinvondemDecken,DukeGeorgeofBraunschweigandLüneburg（HerzogGeorgvonBraunschweigundLüneburg），3：277.
第三篇 常備軍時代
1 總論
1.OntheoriginanddevelopmentoftheAustrianarmyseeHistoryoftheImperialandRoyalArmedForcesfrom1618totheEndoftheNineteenthCentury（GeschichtederkaiserlichenundköniglichenWehrmachtvon1618bisEndedesXIX.Jahrhunderts），publishedbytheDirectorateoftheImperialandRoyalMilitaryArchives.
2 法國
1.FrenchHistory（FranzösischeGeschichte），1：369.
2.Susane,Histoiredelacavalleriefrançaise，1：82.
3.CampaignsofPrinceEugene（FeldzügedesPrinzenEugen），1：507.
4.Susane,Histoiredel'infanterie，1：78.
5.TheSpanishterzios,whichwerecreatedin1544，mayhaveservedasamodeltheirrelationshiptothecolumellasisnotclear.
6.Mention,L'arméedel'ancienrégime.1900.
7.Ritter,GermanHistoryinthePeriodoftheCounterreformation（DeutscheGeschichteimZeitalterderGegenreformation），3：518.
8.André，LeTellier,p.26.
9.André，p.217.
10.AccordingtoSusane,Ed.of1876，p.312，atthebeginningof1791therankandfileoftheinfantrydidnotnumbermorethan125，000men.
11.Susane,Histoiredelacavalleriefrançaise,pp.136，154.
12.LouisAndré，MichelLeTellieretl'organisationdel'arméemonarchique,Paris,FelixAlcan，1906.Thisisalargework,supportedbymanydocuments.AttimesthetendencytoemphasizeLeTellier'saccomplishmentsissomewhattoostrong.In1900theFrenchWarMinistrypublishedaworkentitledHistoriquesdesCorpsdeTroupedel'arméefrançaise（1569-1900）.TheintroductiongivesasummaryoftheimportantreferencessincetheworkbyDanielin1721.Thebookcontainsatabularpresentationofalltroopunitssince1589withoutanyfurthersourcestudies,aswellasthenamesofthecommanders,ofthebattlesinwhichtheunitsparticipated,andsoforth.
13.Susane,p.100.DelaNoueconcludesthattheSpanishinfantrywasbetterthantheFrenchfromthefactthatsomanynoblemenwereintheSpanishservice（Jähns,p.564）.AremarkableaccountofweeklychangesoftheSpanishcommanders,determinedbylot,isreportedfortheyear1538byJovius,Book37，Ed.1578，pp.364，366.
14.DiscoursXIV,Ed.1587，p.338.
15.ThefirsttraceofadistinctioninprinciplebetweenofficersandnoncommissionedofficersIfindinaremarkbydelaNoueinDiscoursXIII,Ed.1587，p.322.InthatpassagehepraisestheSpanishforobeyingtheordersofevensimplesergeants,andtheirofficersallthemore.
16.I.G.Hoyer,HistoryoftheArtofWar（GeschichtederKriegskunst），p.188，whowasstillfamiliarwiththelivingtradition,considersthattheprincipalreasonforthepoordisciplineoftheFrenchintheeighteenthcenturywasthesellingofofficerpositions.Butwemaynotobservesuchpointsinisolationandthenconsiderthemasbasiccauses.IntheEnglisharmy,too,thesaleofpositionswascommon,anditnotonlymaintaineditsdiscipline,butthisdeformityevenofferedtheadvantagethatanoutstandingman,ifhewasalsorich,couldattainahighercommandpositionataveryyoungage.ThusWellingtonbecamealieutenantcolonelatagetwenty-three.
17.TherelationshipofthenobleandbourgeoisofficersintheFrencharmyistreatedverythoroughlyinthebookbyLouisTuetey,TheOfficersundertheAncienRégime,NoblesandCommoners（Lesofficierssousl'ancienrégime,noblesetroturiers），Paris，1908.
18.Puységur,Chap.VI,p.50，estimatessixteentoseventeenmenforeachofficer,butonp.103，sometwenty-fivemenperofficer.Sicard,HistoiredesinstitutionsmilitairesdesFrançais，2：229，estimatestwelvetothirteenmenperofficer（79，050：6553），andonp.244，nineteentotwentymen（686：35intheinfantrybattalion）.Susane,Histoiredel'infanteriefrançaise，1：278，hasfifteenmenperofficer（685：35）.Berenhorst,Observations（Betrachtungen），1：61，estimateseighteenmenforoneofficer（900：50）.Susaneaddstohisnumbersthestatementthatin1718thenumberwasfoundtobemuchtoolargeandconsequentlythenumberofcompanieswasreduced,butin1734theywereagainincreased.Hoyer,GeschichtederKriegskunst，2：505，statesthat,asaresultofthereformsoftheministerofwar,St.Germain,thestrengthofthecompanieswasfixedat125souls,includingsevenoreightofficers.ChuquetsaysthenumberofFrenchofficersin1789wasabout9，000.InAustria,too,thenumberofofficersatthetimeofPrinceEugenewasverylarge.Montecuccolirequiredthirty-threeofficersfor1，500men.InDecember1740Prussiahad3，116officersforabout100，000men,andin17865，300officersforsome200，000men.TheThünaregimentin1784numberedfifty-twoofficersand2，186noncommissionedofficersandmen,includingfortyreserves,consequentlyoneofficerforforty-twomen.Militär-Wochenblatt，1909，col.3768.
19.ThestatementsinthebiographiesbySarrans-JeuneandKläber,concerningBernadotte'sentranceintoservice,donotagreecompletely.
20.Daniels,PreussischeJahrbücher，77：523.
21.Hoyer,GeschichtederKriegskunst，2：199.AccordingtoNys,InternationalLaw（Ledroitinternational），3：512，thefirsttreatyonransomswasmadein1550betweenMauriceofSaxonyandMagdeburg.Theransomwasnottoexceedonemonth'spay.Heffter-Geffcken,InternationalLaw（Völkerrecht），section142，namesastheoldestagreementconcerningtheexchangeofprisonersandransomsatreatybetweenFranceandHollandin1673.Pradier-Fodéré，Traitédedroitinternationalpublic，7：45，referstostillothertreaties.Attimesthemaximumlimitforaransomwasfixedatthepayforaquarteroftheyear.
22.ThefirstpromisetocareforthesickandwoundedthatIcanrememberhavingreadiscontainedinapaycontractofStralsundof1510（Beck,Artikelsbriefe,p.118），wherecareofthewoundedandofdisabledveteransispromised.
23.Daniels，&ldquoFerdinandvonBraunschweig，&rdquoPreussischeJahrbücher，80：509.Seealso79：287.
3 勃蘭登堡-普魯士
1.TheNetherlanderLeHon（Hondius）wroteconcerningWallhausen（Jähns，2：1039）：
WallhausenhasmadealargebookofthedrillsofaregimentwhichdonotoccuramongusandwerealsonotusedbythePrinceofOrange...whicharenothingmorethanfantasiesthatoneputsonpaperandwhichcannotbeappliedbyanyofficerorsoldier,indeednotbytheauthorhimself,who,likeIcarus,wantstoflysohighthathemustfalldownfromabove,whothinksthatbyputtingfiguresonpapertheymustbeheardbymanypeople.
TheFrenchmanBardincalledWallhausen'sKriegskunstzuFuss&ldquoanillegibleconfusedmixture,fromwhichthereisnothingtobelearned&rdquo（Jähns，2：1042）.
2.InhisdefenseletitbenotedthatevenasoldierlikeMontecuccoliwrotesomethingsimilar：&ldquoIfonewishestoformaunitoflancers,notfortheattackbutfordefense,onecangiveitasquareformation,facingtowardallfoursides.&rdquoRoundorsphericalformationswerealsorecommended.Writings（Schriften），1：352.
3.L.Plathner，&ldquoCountJohnofNassauandtheFirstMilitarySchool&rdquo（&ldquoGrafJohannvonNassauunddieersteKriegsschule&rdquo），Berlindissertation，1913.
4.Around1559CountReinhartSolmswroteamilitaryencyclopedia,whichJähns，1：510，calls&ldquoMilitaryGovernment&rdquo（&ldquoKriegsregierung&rdquo），inwhichheemphaticallyrejectstheideaofthemilitia,sincethemenwouldrunawaywhenthesituationbecameserious.LazarusSchwendiwasinfavorofthemilitia（Jähns,p.539）.GeneralvonKlitzingdrewupareportforDukeGeorgofBraunschweig-Lüneburginwhichhestatedthat,accordingtohisexperience,militiamencouldnotstanduptorecruitedtroops.Herecommendedmixingrecruitedsoldiersandthosewhowerelevied.VondemDecken,DukeGeorgeofBraunschweig-Lüneburg（HerzogGeorgvonBraunschweig-Lüneburg），2：189.
5.ThemilitiawasonlyusedwithsuccessonceinasecondaryrolewhenthedukemovedintoBohemiain1620，heusedthemilitiatoprotecthiscountryagainsttheUnion.Krebs,BattleontheWhiteMountain（SchlachtamweissenBerge），p.32.
6.WhentheburgomasterofAugsburgin1544forcedallthecitizenstoprocureweaponsandparticipateindailydrills,theentirecityroseupagainstthisprocedureandsaiditwasnonsense,anunnecessarywasteoftimeandmoney,since,inviewoftheimportanceofAugsburg'sindustries,thispurposecouldbetterandmorecheaplybeaccomplishedwithpaidmercenaries.Schmoller,TübingerZeitschrift，16：486.
7.Jany,TheBeginningsoftheOldArmy（DieAnfängederaltenArmee），p.2.
8.Jany，1：10.Krollmann,TheDefenseWorkintheKingdomofPrussia（DasDefensionswerkimKönigreichPreussen），1909.
9.Meynert,HistoryoftheMilitaryandofArmyOrganizationsinEurope（GeschichtedesKriegswesensundderHeerverfassungeninEuropa），2：99.
10.InJune1625thetotalcostofdeliveriesinHessetakenbythebilletedtroopsoftheLeaguesince1623onlyinthecitiesandthevillagessubjecttotheprinces（andnotthevillagesofthenobility），withoutcountingrobberiesanddestruction,wasestimatedas3，318，000imperialtalers.ThiswasmuchmorethantentimestheamountapprovedbytheEstatesthreeyearsearlierforthelandgrave,butwithwhichthecountryhadnotbeenabletobedefended.M.Ritter,GermanHistory（DeutscheGeschichte），3：260.GindelyestimatesthetotalcontributionsraisedbyWallensteininhisfirstperiodofcommandasbetween200and210milliontalers.ThecityofHallealoneshowedthatfromDecember1625toSeptember1627ithadpaid430，274guilders.
11.Droysen,PrussianPolitics（PreussischePolitik），3：1，49.
12.vonBonin，&ldquoTheWarCounciloftheElectorateofBrandenburg，1630-41&rdquo（&ldquoDerkurbrandenburgischeKriegsrat，1630-1641&rdquo），Brandenburgisch-PreussischeForschungen，1913，p.51ff.
13.Researchersarenotyetcompletelyinagreementonthecontentandthenatureofthereductionof1641andofthestrengthuntil1656.J.G.Droysen'sconceptthatitwasprincipallyaquestionin1641ofarelieffromthedoubleobligationtotheemperorandtheprinceelectorandthattheyoungrulersimultaneouslybroketheoppositionofthecolonelsandtheEstatesinordertocreatetheunifiedarmythenceforthobligatedonlytotheprincehasnowbeengenerallydropped.Meinardus，&ldquoMinutesandAccountsoftheBrandenburgPrivyCouncil&rdquo（&ldquoProtokolleundRelationendesBrandenburgischenGeheimenRats&rdquo），introductiontothefirstandsecondvolumes.Article，&ldquoSchwarzenberg&rdquointheAllgemeineDeutscheBiographie.ArticleinthePreussischeJahrbücher,Vol.86，bySchrötter，&ldquoTheBrandenburg-PrussianArmyOrganizationUndertheGreatElector&rdquo（&ldquoDiebrandenburgisch-preussischeHeeresverfassungunterdemGrossenKurfürsten&rdquo），1892.Brake，&ldquoTheReductionoftheBrandenburg-PrussianArmyintheSummerof1641&rdquo（&ldquoDieReduktiondesbrandenburgisch-preussischenHeeresimSommer1641&rdquo），Bonndissertation，1898.InthisconnectionseealsoMeinardus,HistorischeZeitschrift，81：556，82：370.Jany，&ldquoDieAnfängederaltenArmee.&rdquoUrkundlicheBeiträgezurGeschichtedespreussischenHeeres（DocumentaryContributionstotheHistoryofthePrussianArmy），Vol.1，1901.
14.FerdinandHirsch，&ldquoTheArmyoftheGreatElector&rdquo（&ldquoDieArmeedesGrossenKurfürsten&rdquo），HistorischeZeitschrift，53（1885）：231.
15.ThisimportantobservationismadebyB.vonBoninintheArchivesforMilitaryLaw（ArchivfürMilitärrecht），1911，p.262.
16.Seethearticle&ldquoThePrussianDistrictPresident&rdquo（&ldquoDerpreussischeLandrat&rdquo）inmyHistoricalandPoliticalEssays（HistorischeundpolitischeAufsätze），wherethedifferencebetweenthePrussian,English,andFrenchadministrativesystemsisdiscussed.
17.Ritter，&ldquoWallenstein'sSystemofContributions&rdquo（&ldquoDasKontributionssystemWallensteins&rdquo），HistorischeZeitschrift，90：193.InWallenstein'sarmyadministration,whichattemptedtoassurethat,despitealltheircontributions,theburghersandpeasantscouldtoleratethemquitewell,Rankehasalreadyrecognizedthe&ldquotraitofthenationalprince&rdquointhegreatcondottiere.
18.vonSchrötter，&ldquoTheBringingofthePrussianArmytoStrengthUndertheFirstKing&rdquo（&ldquoDieErgänzungdespreussischenHeeresunterdemerstenKönige&rdquo），Brandenburgisch-preussischeForschungen，1910，p.413.
19.Schrötter,Brandenburgisch-preussischeForschungen，23：463.
20.Asananalogytothewaytheold&ldquoLandDefense&rdquowascarriedoverintothestandingarmy,letusnoteanegotiationbetweentheemperorandtheLowerAustrianEstatesin1639.TheEstateswantedtoestablishtheprinciplethatthelanddefensecouldonlybeusedwithintheterritorialborders.Theemperordemandedthateverytwentiethmanbeprovidedandproposedforconsideration&ldquowhetherthesemencouldbetterbeusedbyassigningthemtoaspecialcorpsorwhethertheyshouldbeincorporatedasfillersintheoldregiments.&rdquoAccordingtoMeynert,GeschichtedesKriegswesens，3：10.
21.ThestandardstudyisMaxLehmann's&ldquoRecruitment,ServiceObligation,andSystemofLeavesintheArmyofFrederickWilliamI&rdquo（&ldquoWerbung,WehrpflichtundBeurlaubungimHeereFriedrichWilhelmsI.&rdquo），HistorischeZeitschrift,Vol.67，1891.AveryclearinsightofthestructureofthePrussianarmyintheeighteenthcentury,basedwordforwordonthesources,isgivenintheworkofErwinDette,FredericktheGreatandHisArmy（FriedrichderGrosseundseinHeer），Göttingen,VanderhoeckundRuprecht，1915.Ihavetakenseveralcharacteris