注釋
關燈
小
中
大
asedhisworktooexclusivelyonGuicciardini,whileRankeandJähnsusedastheirprincipalsourceCoccinius,whocanhardlybecomparedtothebettersources.Thestandardstudy,basedonthesources,istheBerlindissertationbyErichSiedersleben（1907）.PublishedbyGeorgNauck.HisprincipalsourcesarealetterwrittenbyFabriciusColonna,whocommandedtheknightsontheSpanishside（printedinMarinoSanuto,Diarii，14：176.Venice，1886），andareportfromtheFlorentineambassador,Pandolfini,whowaspresentatthebattleintheFrenchheadquarters（printedinDesjardins,NégociationsdiplomatiquesdelaFranceaveclaToscane，2：581.Paris，1861）.
3.AccordingtoColonna'sletter.
4.TheItaliansurveymapindicatesthattheditchstillexiststodaybutdoesnotextendasclosetotheRoncoasitdid,accordingtooursources,atthetimeofthebattlein1512.
5.Iincludethe400lancesthatwereinpositionattheRoncobridgeunderAlègreandintervenedinthebattle.
6.Theartillerymaneuverisnotcompletelyclear,sincewecannotassume,asGuicciardinirecounts,thatEstedrovecompletelyintotherightflankoftheenemy,andthecannoncertainlydidnothaveenoughrangetoshootalongtheentireenemyfront.Perhapsanotherinspectionofthebattlefieldwouldclarifythispoint.
7.Thisbattleistreatedintwovaluablemonographsthatappearedinquicksuccession:NovaraandDijon.ApogeeandDeclineoftheSwissGreatPowerintheSixteenthCentury（NovaraundDijon.HöhepunktundVerfallderschweizerischenGrossmachtim16.Jahrhundert），byDoctorofPhilosophyE.Gagliardi.Zurich，1907.PublishedbyLeemannBrothersandCo.&ldquoTheBattleofNovara&rdquo（&ldquoDieSchlachtbeiNovara&rdquo），byGeorgFischer.Berlindissertation，1908.PublishedbyGeorgNauck.
8.GagliardiandFischerarrangetheindividualelementsofthebattleverydifferently,indeedevencontradictingoneanother,sinceFischerplacesontherightflankwhatGagliardiseemstoreportfortheleftflank.IagreewithFischer.Nevertheless,whenFischerassignsonly1，000mentothenorthsquareoftheSwiss，2，000tothecentersquare,and7，000tothesouthsquare,Idonotsaythatthatisimpossible,butIdonotconsideritascertain.IftheSwisshadgoodinformationontheenemyandknewthatthelansquenetswereinthesouthernpartofthecampbutthattherewasnofavorableterrainthereforhorsemen,theymaywellhavemadethenortherlyandcentralcolumnsofinfantryveryweak,assigninginreturnthehorsementotheformerandthecannontothelatter.Buttheymayhavegiventhesetwounitsonlymissionscallingfordemonstrations,whileassigningtheactualattackexclusivelytothethirdsquareandgivingitseven-tenthsoftheentireinfantry.Butwemaybelievesuchfinepointsonlyifwehavedirectandreliablesourcesconcerningthem.Consequently,althoughIagreeessentiallywithFischer,Ihaveexpressedmyselfmorecarefullyandwithmorerestraintandhaveavoidedgivingspecificnumbersforthevarioustroopunits.
9.Thesourcesspeakof400Swisshalberdierswhoreportedlyfirstdroveofftheharquebusiersofthelansquenetsandthenattackedthemainbodyintheflank.Gagliardi（p.162）considersthemtobeaunitthatarrivedbychance,whileFischer（p.138）considersthisadetachmentthatwassentoutintentionally.Isuspectthattheseweremenwhowelledoutononesidewhenthemainbodiesclashed.
10.ThisbattleisstudiedinanexemplarywaybyOttoHaintzinthedissertation&ldquoFromNovaratoLaMotta&rdquo（&ldquoVonNovarabisLaMotta&rdquo）.Berlin，1912.
11.ThispolarityisdevelopedexcellentlybyGagliardi,NovaraundDijon,p.327.
12.ThemonographbyHeinrichHarkensee（Göttingendissertation，1909），whilealsocontributingtotheresearchindetail,didnotarriveattacticallycorrectconceptsoftheoverallbattle.Thecorrectionsthatneedtobemadeareapparentwhenthisworkiscomparedwiththeaccountabove.Inparticular,HarkenseeattributestoomuchcredibilitytotheexaggerationsinthefiguresfortheFrenchstrength.Hadank'sreviewintheDeutscheLiteraturzeitung,No.26，1910，concentratestoomuchondetailsandunjustlyraisestheaccusationthattheauthordidnotunderstandthestrategicsituation.Hemay,however,becorrectinhisreckoningoftheFrenchstrengthas30，000.HealsojustifiablydefendsthereportthattheGasconshadlargeshieldsthatcouldbeplacedonthegroundasabase.Suchshields（pavesen）wereusedbythemarksmen.Hereferstoaminiatureshowingcrossbowmenwithlargeshieldsofthiskindinfrontofthem.Hewett,AncientArmourandWeapons，3：543（Supplement）.
13.Onpage36abovethereisaquotethatpraisestheSwissartillery.Thefactsdonotjustifythis.
14.&ldquoTheBattleofBicocca&rdquo（&ldquoDieSchlachtbeiBicocca&rdquo），byPaulKopitsch.Berlindissertation，1909.PublishedbyE.Ebering.
15.InGuicciardinitheaccountreads：&ldquoTheywantedtoreturnhome,butinordertoshowthewholeworldthatitwasnotbecauseoffear,theyfirstwantedtodefeattheenemy.&rdquoItispossiblethatthisstatementwasmade,butiftheyhadbeenvictorious,theSwisswouldnodoubtstillhaveremained,andsotheynodoubtintendedinthebottomoftheirheartstodosofromthestart.
16.ThestandardmonographistheBerlindissertationbyReinhardThom（1907），which,asaresultofprecisesourceanalysis,correctsmanyindividualerrorsinearlieraccounts.AfewadditionalsourcesmentionedinthereviewofthismonographintheDeutscheLiteraturzeitung,No.8，1909，arenotofconcerntous.
17.ThereportbytheambassadorfromSienaspecificallygivesthisasthereasonforthecarelessnessoftheFrench.
18.BerlindissertationbyKarlStallwitz，1911.ReviewbyHadankintheDeutscheLiteraturzeitung,No.16，1912.
6 馬基雅維利
1.Guillaume,p.165.
2.E.Fueter,inareviewofHobohm'sworkintheHistorischeZeitschrift，113：578，whilerecognizingthehighvalueofthework,neverthelesstakesexceptionindetailtomanypoints,chargestheauthorwithalackofmethodologicalschoolingandeveninsufficientknowledgeofwarfareandoftheItalianlanguage.IhavecheckedontheseaccusationsandhavecomparedthemwithahandwrittencountercritiquebyHobohm.Theresultisthatthereproachfallsbackonthecritic.Evenifallthedetailsthathecriticizeswererealerrors,incomparisonwiththestupendousscholarshipandthecriticalperceptivenesswithwhichHobohmsweepsasidemountainsofmisjudgmentsappearinginthesourcesandconstructspositivenewknowledge,thoseerrorswouldhaveverylittlesignificance.ButmystudyshowsthatofalltheobjectionsandcorrectionsmadebyFueter,notevenasingleone&mdashreallynotasingleone&mdashisjustified.ItisnotthatHobohm'sunderstandingofItalianisinsufficient,butratherthatFueterdidnotknowthedifferencesbetweenmodernItalianandtheItalianofthesixteenthcentury.ItisnotHobohmwhointroduceserroneousmaterialconcerningthewarfareofthattimebutFueter.Letusgivebutthreeexamples:Machiavellirecommendsthatintheselectionofcorporalsforthemilitiaitshouldbetakenintoconsiderationthattheyareacceptabletotheotherconscripts（&ldquoscripti&rdquo）.Fueterisnotfamiliarwiththisprincipleandthislanguage.Heclaimsheisbringingsenseintothisprescriptionbytranslatingconscripts（&ldquoscripti&rdquo）withtheword&ldquoinstructions&rdquoandsaysthatHobohm,becauseofwhatisactuallyhiscorrecttranslationofthepassage,isunknowledgeable.Furthermore,Machiavellirecruitedhismilitiaexclusivelyfromthepeasantsofthesubjectedcountryside,andnotfromtheburghers.FueterreadHobohm'sbooksohastilythatheattributedtothesepeasantstheattitudesofthe&ldquoFlorentinemerchantnation.&rdquo
AthirdfeatureofMachiavelli'smilitiasystemwasthefactthatFlorencediditsbest,eventhoughnotalwayswithsuccess,topreventitssubjectsfromgoingoffasmercenaries,whereasinSwitzerlandandGermanythatwasofficiallypermittedandoftenevenmoreorlessorganized.Fueterhadsuchlittleunderstandingoftheseoppositeattitudes,whichareexplainedbyHobohminaveryinterestingandthoroughmanner,thathebelievesMachiavelliborrowedtheofficialregulationsforsendingmenoffformercenaryservicefromtheSwissmilitarysystem,andheattemptstocorrectHobohminthismatterwithstrongemphasis.Andthusitcontinuespointbypoint,andIcanonlyregretthattheHistorischeZeitschrifthasmisleditsreadersonsuchabasicwork.
3.Jähns，1：336.
4.Historiad'Italia,L.IX.Venice，1562，p.425.
5.Jovius,Elogiavirorumbellicavirtuteillustrium（AphorismsofMenDistinguishedbyMilitaryVirtues），Basel，1575，p.323.
6.Hobohm，2：457，464.FalsearmystrengthsforNovaraandMarignano:Discorsi，2：18.AlsoEscher，&ldquoTheSwissFootTroopsintheFifteenthCenturyandattheBeginningoftheSixteenthCentury&rdquo（&ldquoDasschweizerischeFussvolkim15.undimAnfangdes16.Jahrhunderts&rdquo），NeujahrsblätterderZüricherFeuerwerker，1904-1907，explainsthoroughlythatMachiavellidoesnotportraycorrectlyeitherthearmamentortheformationoftheSwiss.
第二篇 宗教戰争時期
1 騎士向現代騎兵的過渡
1.GeorgeT.Denison'sHistoryoftheCavalryfromtheEarliestTimes,withObservationsConcerningItsFuture（GeschichtederKavallerieseitdenfrühestenZeitenmitBetrachtungenüberihreZukunft），（GermanversionbyBrix,Berlin，1879）hasnoscientific-historicalvalue.
2.Concerningthedisputeovertheexplanationofthename,seeMangoldintheJahresberichtderGeschichtswissenschaften，3（1892）：247.ThehussarsarementionedquiteoftenintheKüstrinBattleReportonMühlberginRanke,Werke，6：244-246，andinthereportoftheNurembergparticipantinthewar,JoachimImhof,inKnaake,ContributionstotheHistoryofCharlesV（BeiträgezurGeschichteKarlsV.），Stendal，1864，p.46.OfparticularinterestisAvila,HistoryoftheSchmalkaldicWar（GeschichtedesSchmalkaldischenKrieges），Germanedition,p.123.AccordingtoSusane，1：150，therehadbeenHungariancavalryinFrancesince1635；in1693aregimentofhussarswasformed.
3.SeeJähns，1：498，concerningthisbook.Hauser,inLesSourcesdel'histoiredeFrance，2：25，rejectsduBellayastheauthorandsays,probablycorrectly,thattheeditionof1548wastheoldest（Jähnsassumes1535）.Averylargepartofthecontents,butnotthepassageabovecopiedfromVol.I,Chap.8，istakenfromMachiavelli.SeeGebelin,Quidreimilitarisdoctrinarenascentibuslitterisantiquitatisdebuerit（WhatMilitaryDoctrineOwedtotheRenaissance），Bordeaux，1881，p.44.
4.Jovius,Book44，Ed.1578，p.555.
5.Book45，p.610.
6.ReportoftheVenetianAmbassadorNavageroofJuly1546（BerichtdesvenezianischenGesandtenNavagerovomJuli1546），inAlbèri,SeriesI,Vol.I,pp.314，328.Healsodescribesthearmsofthesehorsemen（p.314）.Thepistol,whichanotherreportshowsthemashaving（Ranke,Werke，4：223），isnotyetmentionedinthisreport.
7.AloisMocenigo,RelazionediGermania，1548.Ed.Fiedler,Fontesrer.austriacarum（SourcesofAustrianHistory），30：120，Vienna，1870.
8.Vol.Ill,Book3，Chap.2，p.289.
9.Jähns，1：740.
10.SeethedetailedextractinJähns'GeschichtederKriegswissenschaften，1：474.
11.Jähns，1：521.
12.NapoleonIIIwritesinhisarticleentitled&ldquoOnthePastandFutureofArtillery&rdquo（&ldquoDupasséetdel'avenirdel'artillerie&rdquo），Oeuvres，4：200：
Saint-LucsaysinhisObservationsmilitairesthatthedukeofAlba,havingfoundthesquadronsofthereîtrestoodeep,wantedtoformhisownmenwiththeirfronttwiceaswideastheirdepth.Inthisway,supposingthateachhorsewouldoccupyaspaceof6pacesby2，heestimatedthatasquadronof1，700horsesinseventeenrankswouldoccupyarectangleof102pacesby204.
ThepassagebySaint-Lucdoesnotyetseemtohavebeenprinted.
13.EditedbyBuchon,p.122.
14.ThatmaybeconcludedfromDiscourseXV（Ed.1587，p.345），whereitisassumedthatavictorioussquadronwouldstillonlydirectlythrowbackfifteenorsixteenoftheenemydrawnupinline,thatis,withanormalstrengthof100，one-sixthorone-seventhofthetotal.SeeDiscourseXVIII.
15.NapoleonIII,intheworkcitedinNote12above,saysthatHenryIVhadsquadronsof300to500horses,whichweredrawnupinfiveranks.HestatesthatMontgomeryrequiredthatthemen-at-armsweretoformintenranksandthelighthorseinseven.Billon,inLesprincipesdel'artmilitaire,Germanedition,p.254（1613），wouldhavethesquadronformedwithadepthoffiveranks，&ldquoforthehorsesdonotpressoneanotherstrongly.&rdquo
16.GeorgPaetel,TheOrganizationoftheHessianArmyunderPhiliptheMagnanimous（DieOrganisationdeshessischenHeeresunterPhilippdemGrossmütigen），1897.Seeespeciallypp.38，40.SeealsoJovius,Book34，p.278，concerningSpanisharmor.
17.AccordingtothereportsoftheVenetianambassadorAloisMocenigo,whoaccompaniedtheemperor.Fiedler,Fontesrer.Austriacarum，30：120.VenetianDispatchesfromtheImperialCourt（VenetianischeDepeschenvomKaiserhof），publishedbytheHistorischeKommissionderAkademiederWissenschaften,Vienna，1889，1：668，670-671.
18.TheyarefirstmentionedinAvila,SchmalkaldicWar,Germanedition，1853，p.58.Firstedition,Venice，1548，p.34.Inaletterdated6November1552，LazarusSchwendireferstothehorsemenofAlbrechtAlcibiadesas&ldquoblackhorsemen.&rdquoVoigt,AlbrechtAlcibiades，2：8.In1554，1，500&ldquoblackhorsemen&rdquoappearintheimperialcampbeforeNamur,allwithpennonsontheirlances.AnonymousJournal（1554-1557），editedbyLouisTorfs,CampagnesdeCharles-QuintetdePhilippeII,Antwerp，1868，pp.23-24.Therearenumerousreferencesinthisjournaltotheirmutinies.In1554thereappearsontheemperor'sside&ldquounostdereistres&rdquo（&ldquoahostofreîtres&rdquo）of1，800to2，000horsesunderCountWolframvonSchwarzenburg.Rabutin,CommentairesL.VI,Ed.Buchon，1836，p.620：&ldquoInordertointimidateus,theyhadallmadethemselvesblacklikehandsomedevils.&rdquoForthecampaignof1558，HenryII,lookingbacktotheexperiencesofthepreviousyearatSt.Quentin,orderedtherecruitingofasmanyreîtresaspossible.
...because,thepreviousyear,thelargeststrengththathisenemy（PhilipII）hadandwhichwasestimatedasgivinghimtheadvantage,wasbymeansofthesereîtres,whohavesincebeencalled&ldquoblackarmor，&rdquoallofwhombeingarmedwithpistols,furiousandfrighteningfirearms,seemedtohavebeeninventedfortheamazementandthebreakingupoftheFrenchmen-at-arms.Andyet,inordertotakeasmanyofthemaspossibleawayfromhisenemyandtoaccustomandteachtheFrenchhowtousesucharmswithconfidence,hewishedtodrawthemintohisservice.
Rabutin,L.XI,Ed.Buchon，1836，p.738.ThefirstGermanpistolmeninFrenchserviceappeared,asbestIhavefound,in1554（Rabutin,p.605）.Susanebelievestheyappearedstillearlier.Rabutin,p.701，makesadistinctionin1557intheFrencharmybetweenmen-at-arms,cavalry,andreîtres.Theexpression&ldquohorsemen&rdquo（&ldquoReiter&rdquo）forcavalry,apparentlywiththeintentionofindicatingsomethingspecific,appearsinMarinoCavallis,RelazionedaFerdinandoRedeRomani，1543.Ed.Albèri,SeriesI,Vol.III,p.122.
19.Theyarementionedforthefirsttimeinanaccountof1559，wheretheyaregivenverylittlepraise.RelationdeMichelSuriano,madeonthereturnfromhisambassadorshiptoPhilipII,in1559.Gachard,RelationsdesambassadeursvénitienssurCharles-QuintetPhilippeII,Brussels，1856，p.116.Clonard，4：155，placestheirfirstmentionintheOrdinanzaof1560.
20.HistoryoftheNetherlandsWar（GeschichtedesniederländischenKrieges），BookII,Chaps.11，12.
21.Mocenigoreportstothedogeon4September1546：&ldquoTheimperialmountedtroopsfeartheirenemiesverymuch,bothbecauseoftheirnumbersandtheirexcellenthorsesandbecausemanyofthemhavethreesmallwheellockharquebuses,oneonthesaddle,anotherbehindthesaddle,andthethirdinaboot,sothatitissaidoftheselighthorsementhatinskirmishestheyalwaysconsiderthemselvessecure,becausehavingdealtwiththeirenemieswithoneharquebus,theyseizeanother,andmanytimes,evenwhenfleeing,theyputitontheirshoulderandfiretotherear.&rdquoVenetianischeDepeschenvomKaiserhof,Vienna，1889，1：670-671.
AsimilarreportismadebyFederigoBadoero（RelazionediCarloVediFilippoII，1557.Ed.Albèri,SeriesI，3：189-190）aboutferraruoliwhowereequippedwithfourorfivepistols.
22.Inthe&ldquoRecollectionsofanOldOfficer&rdquo（FeuilletonofthePostof21May1890）weread：
Atthattime（1847），itwasstillthepracticetotarget-shootfromhorseback,afrightfulmaneuverduringwhichveryfewhorsesstoodstill.Anoncommissionedofficerwouldhandtheloadedpistol,providedwithafuse,withthegreatestcaretothemountedhorseman.Nowthehorsemanwastorideavolt,haltinfrontofthetarget,andfire.Butassoonasthehorsenoticedthattheriderhadapistolinhishand,heusuallystartedtobuckandjump,andthehorseman,hismount,andthebystanderswereallmostseriouslyendangered.Anditthensometimeshappenedthatthehorsewasshotintheear.Butnowithappenedthatourgoodfirstlieutenant,vonB.，hadanoldsorrelmarenamedCommode,andwheneverhewasinchargeofthepracticefiring,thewholeplatoon,oneaftertheother,climbedaboardCommode,whostoodquietly,andeachmanfiredhisshotaccurately.Nowthisfoolishnesshasbeenabandonedandthefiringisdoneonlyinadismountedposition,although,ofcourse,signalshotsbymountedscoutsarenotexcluded.
23.Wallhausen,KriegskunstzuPferde,p.6.
24.Mencken，2：1427.
25.Ed.Buchon,p.291.OnTavannes,seep.127，above.
26.IhavejustreceivedastudybyR.FriedrichsdorfonAlbrechtasaleaderofmountedtroops（Berlindissertation，1919）.Itcontainsnewandveryvaluablematerial.
27.Inthesecondeditionofthiswork,Basel，1572，thedescriptionissomewhatexpanded（BookIX,Fol.309），butwithoutaddinganythingofsignificanceforus.LancelotVoisin,SiredelaPopelinière,camefromPoitouandwasastudentinToulousewhenthenewsofthebloodbathofVassybecamepublic.HeimmediatelytookcommandofaHuguenotcompanyofstudents,waseventuallyincapacitatedastheresultofawound,andthenceforthhetookupthepen.
28.IntheaccountofthebattleofIvry,p.386.Sincethisbattledidnottakeplaceuntil1590，itistheyoungerTavanneswhoisspeakinghere.
29.InthefourthchapterofBook2ofhisKriegskunstzuPferde,p.65，Wallhausendescribestheexecutionofthecaracolebutwithoutusingthatname.ItisalsodescribedbyGrimmelshauseninSimplizissimus,Ed.Gödecke，1897，Vols.10，11，p.36.
30.Brantôme,Oeuvres,Edit.Laianne，1864ff.，4：201.Seealso3：376.InVol.I,pp.339-340，hementionsthisexampleinthesamesenseandspeaksofthebattleofAulneau（1November1587）asaparallel.
31.AtthebaseofthisistheItalian&ldquocorazza，&rdquowhichisderivedfrom&ldquocorium，&rdquo&ldquoleather.&rdquo
32.Forexample,Villar'sMémoires,L.X.，Ed.1610，p.901；thisappearstobefortheyear1559，accordingtoacontemporarydocument.
33.InthesixteenthcenturyacertainCountSolms（Würdinger，2：371）wrotecorrectly&mdashbutinthefinalanalysisneverthelessfalsely：
Whenonehasashorsemenonlywagonservantsandpeasantswhostealtheirhorsesfromwagonsandplows,therewillbeinthefieldbadconductanddesertioninbattleandcampaigns.Andeveniftheydonotfleebutremain,theyarestillnotsufficientlywellmountedandarmored,andtheyhavenotlearnedhowtofightbuttheyremainpeasantsonplowhorsesanddrafthorses.Suchmenshouldnotbebroughtbyanobletothelordwhoprovidesthepay,forthelordreliesontheirnumberswithoutknowingthathehasonlyalooselyformed,worthlessunit.Everyknightlymanwhointendstoleadhorsementoalordshouldponderthis,foritisamatterofhishonorandhiswelfare.Forifhehaspeasantyokelsinhissquadronorbanneretandfindshimselffacedbyagood,wellequippedunit,whatcanheexpecttoaccomplishandwhatpoorservicehehasprovidedhiscommanderinreturnforhismoney.
34.Erben,BulletinoftheImperialandRoyalArmyMuseum（MitteilungendeskaiserlichenundköniglichenHeeresmuseums），1902，ArticlesofWar,etc.
35.Susane,Histoiredelacavalleriefrançaise，1：73，givesasomewhatdifferentoriginofthisarmedbranch.Hedoesnotrelateittofirearmsbutregardsasthesignificantfactoronlythespeedthattheinfantryingeneral,bothlancersandmusketeers,coulddevelopinthiswayduringindividualexpeditions.Becauseoftheterrorthattheyinspired,thesewarriorshadcalledthemselvesdragoons.TheywerecreatedbytheMarquisdeBrissacinthePiedmonttheaterofoperationsbetween1550and1560.AccordingtoJovius,Book44，PietroStrozzihadalreadyplaced500selectedmarksmen（sclopettarii）onhorsebackin1543inordertooccupyGuiseasquicklyaspossible.LudwicoMelzo,Regulemilitari...dellacavalleria（Antwerp，1611）understandsthedragoonstobemountedmarksmen.Jähns，2：1050.Wallhausenhasthemarmedinpartwithpikes.
Basta,BookI,Chap.8，believesthemountedmarksmanorcarabineerwasinventedinPiedmont.Heidentifiesthistype,therefore,withthedragoons.Hugoincludesamongthedragoonsalsomenarmedwithspears,whomoveonhorsebackbutfightonfoot.Militiaequestri，1630，S.184，BookIII,p.4.SeeBookIV,Chap.5，pp.271-272，concerningtheirformationinbattle,withthepikemeninthemiddle,marksmenontherightandleft,andhorsesintherear.
36.When,forexample,theVenetianSoriano,RelazionediFrancia，1562，Ed.Albèri,SeriesI，4：117，saysthatthekingofFrancehad,inadditiontohisknights,foreignferraiuoliecavallileggieri,thelatterprincipallyAlbaniansandItalians,thedifferenceisthatherethecavallaleggieriaretheolderarm,whichdoesnotfightinsuchcloseformationwhereastheferraiuoliweregroupedintightsquadronformationandatthistime，1562，wereprobablyalsoarmedonlywiththepistol.
37.Rabutin,Commentaires,Ed.Buchon,p.573，asaneyewitness.
38.AloiseContarini,RelazionediFrancia,February1572，Ed.Albèri,SeriesI,Vol.IV,pp.232-233.
39.Ed.Buchon,pp.202-203.
40.&ldquoTheformationoftheFrenchiswithabroadfrontandweakrear,becauseeverybodywantstotakepositioninthefrontrankbuttheFlemish,increasingthefilesandenlargingthebody,makeitstrongerandmoresecure.&rdquoReportofMichelSuriano,madeonhisreturnfromhisambassadorshiptoPhilipIIin1559（RelationdeMichelSuriano,faiteauretourdesonAmbassadeauprèsdePhilippeIIen1559）（InGachard,RelationsdesambassadeursvénitienssurCharles-QuintetPhilippeII,Brussels，1856，p.116）.Popelinière,Histoiredestroubles,Livre9（editionof1572，p.309）：&ldquoThereître,becausehefightsinacompletelydifferentwaythantheFrench...&rdquo
41.Andtheworstisthat,inthepast,theyfoughtinasingleline（enhaye）.Theseregimentsmarchinginbattleformationareseparatedfromoneanotherbythefoottroops,theartillery,orotherunits,andtheycannotconvenientlybedrawntogethertoformalargeunitwhentheoccasioncallsforit.Andwhiletheymightstillbeinopencountry,iftheyshouldclosetogether,ifbychancetheking'slieutenantshouldnotbetheretocommandthem,eachofthemwantingtoshowhisworth,withoutconsideringthatbodyoftroops&mdashor,sotospeak,themountainofenemies&mdashthatiscomingtoattackthem,neitherthefearthesoldierscanhave,whoseeingthemselvesweakandoutnumbered,runoff,seekingnotonlytowin,buttosurviveiftheyfaceuptothesetroopswheretheyhaveafourtoonesuperiority,united,pressedtogether,andinquantity,asitissaid.
Theyweretomakethecompanies80to100menstrong,composedofcompatriotswhowereallknowntooneanother,inordertofostercohesiveness.Thecompaniesweretobeformedinregimentsofabout500men（&ldquohommesd'armes&rdquo）.
Cavalryinsingleline（enhaye）isuselesssquadronscomposedof400ridersarethebestsquadronsof1，500and2，000，asisprescribedforthereîtres,woulddefeatthemiftheyweredealingonlywiththese400；andiftherewere1，200inthreeunits,chargingoneaftertheother,Iwouldconsiderthemtohavetheadvantage.Somanymenincloseformationonlycreateconfusion,andonlyafourthofthemfight.Thislargenumberofsoldiersinasquadronisusefulforthereîtres,becausethree-fourthsoftheirmenarenothingbutvilleins.Thefirsttroopsthatchargeagainsttheselargebodiesthrowthemintodisorder,principallystrikingthemontheflank.Andevenifthebodycanholdoffthefirstattackers,thesecondandthirdsquadronssweepthemawayandbreakthemup,chargingfromoneendtotheotherandpassingthroughafterthefirsttworanksarepenetrated,thereislittledangerfromtherest.Hewhohasthelargernumberofsquadronsof300and400mustwinthevictory.GasparddeSaulx-Tavannes,Mémoires,Ed.Buchon，1836，p.328ff.
42.IfindasimilarargumentinaVenetianaccountof1596：
Thereîtreswereeasilybrokenupbythelancesofthelightcavalry.Formerly,wheneachrankhadmadeitswheel,thereîtrescustomarilytightenedtheirwholeformationandawaitedtheassault,facingthelancesthatwerecomingtowardthem,andthen,wideningtheirformation,theywouldletthementeramongthemandwouldhandlethemroughlywiththeirpistolsandtheirarms.Butnowthelancesnolongercomealltogetherinsquadronsbut,dividedintodiverseandsmalldetachments,theyassaultthesquadronsofreîtresfromallsidesandharassthemandthrowthembackandrunthroughthemfromonesidetotheotherandbreakthemupwithgreatfacility.TommasecoContarini,RelazionediGermania，1596.InRelazionedegliAmbasc.Veneti.，Ed.Albèri,SeriesI，6：235.
43.Itwasaquestioninancienttimesandamongthoseofthepresenttimewhetheritwasbettertogointocombatatatrotortoawaittheenemyinplaceitseemsthatthemomentumandthegallopincreasethepowerofthemenandhorsestomowdownthesquadronsbutitalsogivesmuchmoreopportunitytothosewhohavenodesiretobeinvolvedinthischargetohalt,holdtheirmountsinplace,andseparatethemselvesfromthecharge,suchasnewsoldiersandthosethecaptaindoesnottrust.Itseemsthatitwouldbebettertohavethemwaitinformationandfirmlyfixedinplaceoratleastnottotakeupthetrotorgallopbeforeadistanceoftwentypacesfromtheenemy,becausethenthosewhowouldfalloutwouldberecognized,andthecowardswouldbetooashamedtoleavetheirpositionatthemomentofencounteringtheenemy,beingthemoreeasilyseenandrecognizedbytheircaptains,whowouldforcethemtobecourageousinspiteofthemselves.JeanGasparddeSaulx-Tavannes,Mémoires,Ed.Buchon，1836，p.116.
44.Frenchordinanceof16October1568.&ldquoItislikewiseorderedthatthecompaniesofeachregimentofcavalrywillmarchtogetherandintheformationthattheyaretomaintainwhilefighting,inorderthateachmanwillbeaccustomedtoholdinghisposition.&rdquoNothingfurtherwasprescribed.H.Choppin,LesOriginesdelaCavaleriefrançaise,ParisandNancy，1905，p.22.
45.QuitesimilardescriptionsandobservationsarefoundintheHistoryoftheCivilWarsinFrance（StoriadelleguerrecivilidiFrancia），bytheItalianDavila,andintheArtofWar，&ldquoTheDifferencebetweenLaundersandPistolers，&rdquo1590，bytheEnglishmanRogerWilliams.TheyarequotedbyC.H.FirthinCromwell'sArmy,p.129.
46.IntheCommentaires,Vol.XI,Chaps.11，12，Ed.Lonmier-Guillaume，2：214-222.
47.InhisHistoryoftheNetherlandsWar（GeschichtedesNiederländischenKrieges），MendozareportsexpresslyinhisaccountofthebattleontheMookerHeidethatthe&ldquohorsemen&rdquoontheSpanishsidehadawaitedtheattackoftheenemysquadronsinplace&mdashasaresultofwhich,tobesure,theyweredefeated.ItwasonlyacounterattackbyanotherSpanishcavalryunitthatthrewbacktheGueux.
48.Historia,Book44.Ed.1578，p.560.
2 射手數量的增加與步兵戰術的完善
1.Rüstow,GeschichtederInfanterie，1：242f.，349.Jähns，1：724，726，731.Hobohm，2：472.Pätel,TheOrganizationoftheHessianArmyunderPhiliptheMagnanimous（DieOrganisationdeshessischenHeeresunterPhilippdemGrossmütigen）.Philipgavethemarksmenoneguildermorepermonththanthespearmennevertheless,theydidnotreachhalfthestrength.
2.Jähns，1：726.
3.RelazionediVincenzoQuirini,December1507（RelazionedegliambassadoreVeneti[EugenAlbèri,SeriesI，6：21]）.
4.Clonard-Brix,p.57.
5.BookXV,Basel，1578，1：315.
6.TruthfulDescriptionoftheOtherCampaigninAustriaagainsttheTurks...inthePastYear1532.DescribedinDetail.AndnowPreparedinPrintfortheFirstTimeinthisYearof1539.ReprintedinJ.U.D.Goebel,ContributionstotheNationalHistoryofEuropeunderEmperorCharlesV（BeiträgezurStaatsgeschichtevonEuropaunterKaiserKarlV.），Lemgo，1767，p.326.FurtherinformationonthecaracoleistobefoundinHobohm，2：394，405-407，468，483，508.
7.Rabutin,Commentaires,Ed.Buchon,p.530.
8.QuotedinRüstow，1：264.
9.DiscourseXVIII,Paradoxe2，p.384.
10.Jovius,LifeofPescara（Levite...），Venice，1581，p.213.
11.1September1546.Avila,Germanedition,p.39.
12.Therearealsoreportsofmixedcombatofmarksmenandhorsemen（Rüstow，1：314，fromMonluc），butthesecanonlyhavebeenexceptionalcasesthathadnofurtherdevelopment.
13.Joviusin1535beforeGoleta：&ldquoduassclopetariorummanus,quasmanicasvocabant,quodcornuuminstar...&rdquo（&ldquotwobandsofsclopetarii,whichtheycallsleevesbecausetheyarelikewings&rdquo）.Book34，Editionof1578，p.392.In1542beforeOfen,theItalianinfantryofAlessandroVitelli&ldquopromotohastatorumagmineetutrinquesclopettariisincornuaexpansisBarbarasinvadunt&rdquo（&ldquoAfterthecolumnofthepikemenhadbeenmovedforwardandonbothsidesthesclopetariihadbeenextendedonthewings,theyattackedthebarbarians&rdquo）.Jovius,Histories,Book42，p.518.
14.Aswehavealreadyseenonp.94above,Rüstowcalledthisformationthe&ldquoHungarianorder，&rdquowhichhebasedontheViennaparadeof1532.Butthatwasonlyaschematicrepresentationwithoutpracticalsignificance.Theexpressionisnotderivedfromthesourcesanymorethanisthe&ldquoSpanishbrigade.&rdquoWallhausenspeaksnotofa&ldquoHungarianorder，&rdquobutonlyofa&ldquoHungarianinstallation，&rdquothatis,anadministrativearrangementratherthanatacticalone.InhisArtofDismountedWarfare（KriegskunstzuFuss），BookI,Chap.6，p.110，hesaysthatinHungarynoformationotherthanthesquarewasused.Jähns，1：711，callsitfatalthattherehadbeenacceptanceoftheprocedureadvocatedbytheItalianTartagliacallingforplacingthemarksmenintheouterranksofthesquareratherthanaswingsrestingonthesquaresofspearmen,ashadalreadybeenrecommendedbySeldeneckin1480.Thiscriticismseemstometofailtorecognizetheprincipalpoint.Whileitistruethattheformationofmarksmeninwingsofferedtheadvantageofbettersequenceoffireandalsoareasonablysureprotection,nevertheless,whentheattackinghorsemenapproached,themarksmenalwayshadtofindprotectioneitheramongorinsideofthespearmen.
15.Asanexampleofhowlittlewecandependonisolatedreports,evenwhentheyappeartobewellfounded,letusnotethatJorga,HistoryoftheOttomanEmpire（GeschichtedesosmanischenReiches），3：295，tellsofadefeatoftheTurksin1593inwhich&ldquothejanissariesweredestroyedbythenewcavalryoftheWest,theheavyhorsemencladinirononarmoredhorses,andbytheharquebusiers.&rdquoATurkishsourceandaPolishonearecitedasabasis.Consequently,thewritershadheardofthe&ldquonewcavalryoftheWest，&rdquobuttheyhadnotunderstoodinwhatrespectitwasnew,andsotheydescribeitastheancientknights.Ifwewerenotinformedfromothersources,itwouldbeabsolutelyimpossibletorecognizewhatiscorrectinthisexaggerateddescription.ThisisacounterparttothetranspositionofWinkelriedintoaknightlybattle.Asimilarsituationistobefoundinthesameworkonp.314.
16.1608.ArchivesofOranien-Nassau，2dSeries，2：389.
17.InstitutiondeladisciplinemilitaireauRoyaumedeFrance,Lyons，1559，p.96ff.Theauthorhimselfisopposedtothereducedunitsandbelievesthat,sincetherearemarksmenandhorsemenintheintervals,thecannonwouldfindtheirtargetinanycase.Inhisopinion,oneshouldseektopreventthesecondshotbyskirmishingmarksmenandhorsemen.
18.RüstowtreatedtheseformationsverythoroughlyinhisGeschichtederInfanterie.Idonotconsideritnecessarytogointothatindetail,sincewefindnothingofthiskindintherealbattles.
19.Theextenttowhichthe&ldquoterzio&rdquowasanadministrativeoratacticalunitanddesignationrequiresfurtherresearch.
20.Lipsius,demilitiaRomana（OnRomanMilitaryService），5：20，Opera，1613，2：460.DelaNoue,DiscourseXVIII，2dParadoxe.Ed.1587，p.377ff.
3 奧蘭治領主莫裡斯
1.OnthemilitarylibraryofMauriceofOrange,seeCarlNeumann,Rembrandt，1：95.
2.JournalofAnthonyDuyck（JournaalvanAnthonisDuyck），fiscaladvocateoftheCouncilofState（1591-1602）.PublishedundercommissionoftheWarDepartment,withintroductionandnotesbyLudwigMulder,captainofinfantry，3volumes，1862-1866，s'GravenhageandArnhem.Duyck'sofficewasthatofachiefofthewarchancelleryoftheCouncilofStateandofthehighestjuridicalofficialforthearmy（Mulder,preface,p.LXXXVI）.Hewasnormallypresentwiththearmyandkeptadailyaccountofevents.Tojudgefromanexaminationofhisjournal,hewassoexcellentlyinformedonthethoughtsofMauriceastobepossibleonlythroughdirectverbalcontact.InmanypassageswemayconsiderthejournaltobeMaurice'slegacytoposterity.GustavRoloff，&ldquoMauriceofOrangeandtheFoundingoftheModernArmy&rdquo（&ldquoMoritzvonOranienunddieBegründungdesmodernenHeeres&rdquo），PreussischeJahrbücher,Vol.111，1903.
3.Jähns，1：869f.
4.Jähns，1：472，705，saysthatin1521DeliaVallerecommendedtheparadema